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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last 30 years probably the two most influential innovations in microeconomics were
the theory of incentives and the rise of behavioral economics. The theory of incentives
deals with the issue that the real world suffers from informational problems which have to
be overcome to establish efficiency. On the other hand, behavioral economics is concerned
with the observation that people in the real world systematically deviate from the behavior
we would expect from fully rational economic actors as the standard textbook models
describe them.
In the beginning of behavioral economics there was a severe conflict between what
could be called mainstream economists and researchers in behavioral economics. The
proponents of the mainstream argued that real people are probably not rational actors,
but in a competitive market they behave as if they were, as they would be driven out of the
market otherwise. In addition it was argued that deviations from rational behavior were
just idiosyncratic and thus would offset each other in large markets. Addressing this point,
behavioral economists gathered evidence that people’s deviations from predicted behavior
are present at the market level and that they are not idiosyncratic but systematic. Labor
and financial markets were analyzed in depth and these two fields were the first where it
became acceptable to relax standard assumptions in modelling.
Only very few years ago has this discussion somewhat died out and it is more commonly
accepted to also consider behavioral “anomalies” to explain economic outcomes. However,
1
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there is only little work done along these lines. In this thesis I combine the two strands,
incentive theory and behavioral economics, in order to gain new insights in the interplay
between preference characteristics, belief biases, and institutions.
The second chapter of this dissertation is based on the paper Incentive Contracts
under Inequity Aversion1. This chapter analyzes a standard Moral Hazard problem
following Holmstro¨m (1979) but amends this basic model by assuming that the agent is
inequity averse. The concept of inequity aversion, stating that agents suffer from being
better or worse off than others in their reference group, was introduced by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) to capture a wide array of experimentally and empirically observed non–
selfish behavior and was probably the first operationalizable behavioral model of non-
standard preferences. The results we obtain from introducing non–selfishness into the
Moral Hazard problem differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with
empirical findings than these standard results. The key findings are that inequity aversion
alters the structure of optimal contracts systematically. Inequity aversion gives scope for
an additional incentive instrument as the agent can be rewarded for good performance
not only by higher monetary rewards but also by less inequity. In addition, there is
a strong tendency towards linear sharing rules as agents have an incentive to “insure”
not only against variations in wealth but also the perceived fairness of an allocation.
Moreover, enriching the model and allowing for more than one agent, inequity aversion
delivers a simple rationale for the widespread use of team based incentive schemes, even
in environments where standard theory would not predict them. This is again due to the
fact that agents want to be insured against too volatile levels of equity. Finally, we find
along the same line of reasoning that the Sufficient Statistics result is violated. Dependent
on the environment, optimal contracts may be either overdetermined or incomplete. This
depends on how the agent evaluates the fairness of an allocation.
The third chapter, Moral Hazard and Inequity Aversion: A Survey, summa-
rizes the growing literature in the emerging field of behavioral contract theory that in-
corporates social preferences into the analysis of optimal contracts in situations of Moral
Hazard. It contrasts these papers with the model and the results from the previous
chapter. In order to ease this comparison the chapter contains a sketch of the previous
1This paper is joint work with Achim Wambach.
3chapter’s model. Studying these recent contributions emphasizes that taking social pref-
erences into account when analyzing optimal contracts generates important new insights
and can help us gain a better understanding of real world contracts and organizational
structures.
The fourth chapter, A brief Survey on Strategic Delegation, outlines the
literature on strategic delegation. It leads over to the other two main papers of this
thesis that deal with the question to what extent players engaged in non–cooperative
interactions can improve their strategic situation by having agents playing the game on
their behalf. This brief survey summarizes where strategic delegation has been employed,
what its effects are in the respective environments and what are the limitations of its
application.
Chapter five is based on the paper A Model of Delegation in Contests2. In
this paper we look at contests between two groups over a “rent”. The situation is such
that no contracts on the contested rent can be written and the group members may have
differing valuations for this contested rent. In our model the Median Voter Theorem is
applicable and we can show that generically the pivotal group member, with the median
valuation for the rent, will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has
preferences different to her own into the contest. The delegation can be either to more or
less “radical” group members. The direction of delegation depends on the order of moves
and the relative “aggressiveness” of the group medians. Delegation gives the pivotal group
member a strategic tool to gain commitment power for the subsequent contest game. We
show that generically very asymmetric equilibria arise, even if the median group members
value the rent (almost) equally. Delegation leads to a social improvement in terms of
resources spent in the contest. The intuition for the result is that the possibility to
delegate amplifies, possibly minuscule initial differences.
While chapter 5 is concerned with delegation in contests in a rather abstract setting
I will consider delegation in a specific context in what follows. The last paper deals
with the question whether firms can gain a strategic advantage by hiring overconfident
managers. Overconfidence is a phenomenon prominent in the psychological literature
but so far only scarcely dealt with in economics. To introduce the concept I present in
2This paper is joint work with Stefan Brandauer.
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chapter six A brief Survey on Overconfidence. I outline the psychological evidence
for this phenomenon and give a taxonomy for an array of phenomena that come under the
common label of overconfidence. It is pointed out that the psychological studies were early
on concerned with overconfidence amongst professionals and executives, even in top rank
management positions. Furthermore I show how the existence of overconfidence can be
rationalized with economic reasoning, in which contexts the concept has been employed,
and what are its effects in these situations.
Chapter seven, A Strategic Rationale for Overconfident Managers, adds
strategic concerns to the list of economic modelling issues set out in the previous chapter.
We analyze whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overconfident manager for
strategic reasons. We analyze a tournament type version of Bertrand competition and a
linear demand Cournot model. In each case there is an R&D stage where firms can invest
in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. It is this R&D stage
where overconfidence kicks in. Though under some qualifications, we find that under
both specifications firms want to delegate to overconfident managers. The fact that both
under price and quantity competition delegation works in the same direction is distinct
to the standard literature on strategic delegation where optimal delegation in those two
cases works in opposite directions. The models in this chapter not only help explain the
empirical evidence that executives are prone to overconfidence but also deliver testable
implications.
Finally, the Concluding Remarks in chapter eight contain some brief personal re-
flections.
Chapter 2
Contracts under Inequity Aversion
2.1 Introduction
“A given level of pay may be viewed as good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable,
depending on the compensation of others in the reference group, and as such
may result in different behavior. [...] This is a constraint on the use of any
sort of incentive pay.”
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 419)
Although Milgrom and Roberts (1992) straightforwardly state that social preferences
matter in the design of incentive schemes this issue has received little attention – though
the question how to provide appropriate incentives was analyzed in much detail since
Holmstro¨m’s [1979] seminal paper on Moral Hazard 1.
We introduce social preferences2, captured by inequity aversion following Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), into a Holmstro¨m (1979) setting where a principal hires an agent who,
1Exemptions are Kandel and Lazear (1993) on peer pressure or the literature on status concerns in
Public Finance. Examples for the latter are Lommerud (1989) or Konrad and Lommerud (1993).
2Throughout the paper we will use terms like fairness, reciprocity, social preferences, and inequity
aversion somewhat interchangeably. What we mean is reciprocal patterns in behavior captured by inequity
aversion. See Kolm (2003) for a detailed discussion and classification of different concepts of reciprocity.
5
6 CHAPTER 2. CONTRACTS UNDER INEQUITY AVERSION
by his choice of effort, determines the probability distribution of profits. Analyzing this
problem with an agent that suffers from being worse off or better off than the principal
gives us a better understanding of real world contracting. Section 8 contains a number of
empirical findings that can be explained by our simple model.
We find that the optimal contract has to trade off three factors: insurance – incentives
– fairness. The agent’s concern for fairness leads to a tendency towards linear sharing
rules. Furthermore the fairness concern delivers a new incentive instrument, as the agent
can be rewarded for good performance not only by paying more, but also by paying more
equitably. Moreover we find that Holmstro¨m’s Sufficient Statistics result3 is violated as
optimal contracts may be either overdetermined or incomplete. Finally, turning to the
multi–agents case, the fairness motive gives a rationale for the widespread use of team
incentives even if the performed tasks are independent.
Only recently – backed by experimental research4 – theoretical frameworks have been
developed to model other–regarding preferences. Among the most prominent examples
are Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998), Falk and Fischbacher (2000), Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)5. The first three models – Rabin
(1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (forthcoming) and Falk and Fischbacher (2000) –
try to actually model reciprocal behavior. Here the intentions of an agent play a role
in evaluating the results of his actions. Whereas these models are certainly closer to a
realistic modelling of human behavior they are analytically hardly tractable6. In contrast,
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are only concerned with the
effects of actions on final allocations. In these latter two models agents’ utility increases
in own profit but decreases if they are better or worse off than others. While in Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) agents compare own payoffs to everybody else’s payoff, in Bolton and
3The Sufficient Statistics result states that optimal contract should condition on all informative signal
with respect to effort choice and not on uninformative signals.
4See Ga¨chter and Fehr (2001), Fehr and Falk (2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for comprehensive
surveys of these experimental studies.
5These topics have been discussed by sociologists for a long time. See for example Gouldner (1960),
Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) or Berkowitz (1968). In the seventies also economists like Selten (1978)
were interested in them.
6See however the recent paper by Cox and Friedman (2003) who try to build a “tractable model of
reciprocity”.
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Ockenfels (2002) they compare themselves only to the average in the reference group. For
the most part of our paper the two models would coincide in their prediction as there are
only two players. We use the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to conduct our analysis.
While this model neglects intentions and solely focusses on final allocations it fares well
in explaining observed experimental results while being still quite simple and tractable7.
As noted earlier we are not the first to deal with the role of fairness in labor relations.
In Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988) the labor relation is characterized as
a partial gift exchange. A generous wage offer by a firm is interpreted as a gift which
is met by the agent with a high effort choice. It is argued that in order to make use
of this mechanism wages are kept high and this can account for observed involuntary
unemployment. Bewley (1999) offers an extensive survey of numerous interviews with
managers and argues that fairness concerns and the fear of harming “working morale‘”
might explain “Why wages don’t fall during a recession”.
A number of other researchers rely on controlled laboratory experiments to analyze
the effects of social preferences in labor markets. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993)
replicate the world of Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988) in a laboratory and
confirm their prediction that even in very competitive environments markets may not
clear as wages are kept high to trigger a reciprocal high effort choice. Fehr, Ga¨chter,
and Kirchsteiger (1997) argue in an incomplete contracts environment that reciprocity
may serve as a contract enforcement device. They show that agents exert (on average)
more effort if they face a more generous wage offer. Fehr and Falk (1999) finally combine
these two findings and show that principals seem to be aware of the possible contract
enforcement power of reciprocity in an incomplete contracts environment. Here wage
levels remain high despite the fact that there is unemployment and there are workers
willing to work for lower wages. In complete contracts environments however principals
tend to squeeze down wage levels on the market clearing level. See Ga¨chter and Fehr
(2001) for a comprehensive survey of experiments on fairness in the labor market.
Standard economic theory predicts a much more complex and - from a practical point
of view - generally undetermined structure to be the optimal solution to the principal
7Cf. Fehr and Schmidt (2003) where they show how their model performs in explaining experimental
data from numerous experiments.
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agent problem8. However, most real world contracts have a very simple linear structure.
There have been only few attempts to explain this feature in standard contracting models.
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) consider a setting where the agent controls the drift rate
of a Brownian motion. They show that the optimal contract is - for a rather specific
setting - linear in overall outcome. However, the Holmstro¨m and Milgrom result depends
very delicately on the assumptions they make on the stochastic process and on the form
of the utility function9. Innes (1990) assumes instead that the agent is risk neutral but
wealth constrained. Then the optimal contract makes the agent the residual claimant if
the outcome is such that it exceeds a threshold. In those regions the contract takes a
linear form. This implies that the optimal contract has a slope of one, something which
we rarely observe. Finally, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] find a linear sharing rule
to be the optimal sharecropping contract in a setting with bilateral moral hazard. But
again the results depend on their specific assumption that error terms are additive and
normally distributed.
The intuition why inequity aversion in our model helps to explain linearity is straight-
forward. An inequity averse agent cares for everybody getting a “fair share” of surplus.
Now if an additional unit of surplus is to be distributed it should be distributed according
to these fair shares. This holds for every additional unit of surplus. When every marginal
unit is distributed according to fixed shares this is the very definition of a linear sharing
rule.
Next to the topic of linearity another main focus of contract theory has been com-
pleteness of contracts. So while violations of Holmstro¨m’s Sufficient Statistics result with
respect to contractual incompleteness are widely accepted and a huge literature following
Grossman, Hart and Moore deals with its implications, only recently attention has been
paid to the fact that real world contracts may be overdetermined10. Again our model of-
fers an explanation for either observation. Contracts may be overdetermined as inequity
aversion implies an intrinsic interest in the distribution of firms’ profits. If profit consists
8See e.g. Holmstro¨m (1979) or Mirrlees (1999).
9See Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) for a detailed discussion and a discrete time approximation of the
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) continuous time model.
10See for example Bertrand and Mulainathan (2001) who find that CEO pay varies as much with non
informative signals as with informative ones.
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not only of parts influenced by agents’ effort choices, agents might still want to partici-
pate in variations of overall profit. On the other hand this intrinsic interest in a firm’s
profit might render it infeasible to contract on better performance measures than profit
as this might lead to too inequitable distributions. Thus contracts may be incomplete in
equilibrium.
Finally our analysis offers an explanation for the prominence of team incentives. If
workers care about each others payoffs it may be optimal to condition workers’ pay on
their co–workers’ performance. This type of team incentives can be interpreted as a kind
of insurance not only against income shocks but also against the disutility from being
worse or better off than the co–workers.
Recently a couple of papers have dealt with the matter of incorporating social prefer-
ences into contract theory. Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2004) analyze - experimentally and
theoretically - the interaction of fair and selfish agents that are offered contracts by a
principal. They find that incomplete bonus contracts perform better than more complete
contracts. However, they severely restrict the set of contracts available to the principal.
Rob and Zemsky (2002), Huck, Ku¨bler and Weibull (2003), and Neilson and Stowe
(2003) look at optimal incentive intensity when agents exhibit some form of social pref-
erences but restrict the class of contracts to linear incentive schemes. While Neilson and
Stowe (2003) focus on the single agent case Rob and Zemsky (2002) and Huck, Ku¨bler
and Weibull (2003) look at problems with multiple agents.
So do Rey Biel (2002), Itoh (forthcoming), Dur and Glazer (2003) and Bartling and
von Siemens (2004a,b). These papers restrict the agents effort choice to a binary decision
while we allow for a continuous choice. Demougin and Fluet (2003) and Grund and Sliwka
(2003) look at tournaments amongst inequity averse agents. Finally there is Demougin,
Fluet and Helm (2004) who look at a binary choice multi task model11.
As pointed out above, most of these models are less general than ours as they restrict
themselves either to deterministic production technologies, binary effort decisions or in
that they focus their analysis not on inequity aversion but envy, i.e. the worker cares
only about being worse off and not about being better off. The latter effect however is
11For a comprehensive treatment of this literature see Englmaier (forthcoming).
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confirmed by empirical and experimental data.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we explain the
basic model. Section 3 discusses the key assumptions. In section 4 we derive the optimal
contracts for the situation where effort is contractible while in section 5 we focus on the
Moral Hazard problem with non–contractible effort choice. In section 6 we do comparative
statics with respect to the degree of inequity aversion and the profit level. Section 7
contains two extensions. First we allow for additional signals and shed light on the
question of contractual completeness and then we study the multi–agent case. Section 8
compares our main findings with several stylized empirical facts. Section 9 concludes the
chapter and the Appendix contains the proofs.
2.2 The Basic Model
This section sets out the basic model. In the section thereafter we will discuss several
points that might be considered as critical.
We model the interaction between a risk neutral, profit maximizing principal and a
utility maximizing agent who is inequity averse towards his principal. In the extensions
section we deal with the case of multiple agents, exhibiting inequity aversion towards each
other and towards the principal.
The principal hires the agent to work for him. The profit x realized at the end of
the period is continuously distributed in an interval [x, x] with density f(x|e) which is
determined by the effort e exerted by the agent. As the principal is neither risk averse
nor inequity averse he wants to maximize his expected net profit
EUP =
x∫
x
f(x|e)[(x− w(x)]dx
where w(x) is the wage paid to the agent.
The agent’s utility function is additively separable and has three parts: First, he derives
utility from wealth, u(w(x)), which is strictly increasing in the wage payment. Second, he
2.2. THE BASIC MODEL 11
suffers from effort c(e) where only c′(e) > 0 has to hold. Finally the convex function G (·)
captures his concern for equitable allocations. To decide whether an allocation is fair or
unfair the agent compares her payoff w(x) and the principal’s net payoff [x − w(x)]12.
Therefore the agent’s utility is given by
EUA = u (w(x))− c(e)− αG [[x− w(x)]− w(x)]
with G′(·) > 0 if [x− w(x)] > w(x) , G′(·) < 0 if [x− w(x)] < w(x)
G′′(·) > 0
G(0) = 0 , G′(0) = 0
α is the weight the agent puts on achieving equitable outcomes. One could think of
this weight embedded in G(·), but to ease comparative statics we write it explicitly.
Figure 2.1 shows one possible graph of G (·). A quadratic function, (·)2, would be an
example for a function fulfilling our assumptions. However, the function has by no means
to be symmetric around 0, i.e. the equitable allocation. Thus we allow for the agent
suffering much more from disadvantageous inequity than from advantageous inequity.
Note that assuming convexity of G (·) implies an aversion towards lotteries over different
levels of inequity.
We assume that the agent can ensure himself a utility level U in the outside market
implying that the principal has to obey the agent’s participation or individual rationality
constraint EUA > U.
We assume that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property13 applies, i.e.
∂
(
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
)
∂x
> 0.
This ensures that the higher the realization of profit the more likely it is that high effort
was exerted.
12Our results qualitatively also hold for a richer model where the agent compares her net payoff [w(x)−
c(e)] to the principal’s net payoff [x− w(x)]. See the Appendix for a brief exposition of this case.
13Cf. Milgrom [1981].
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G(.)
0 x-2w(x)
Figure 2.1: Example for G(·)
2.3 Discussion
This section addresses several aspects of the model that might be considered critical. We
start with our assumption that the principal has no concern for equity, but is selfish.
We believe self selection of profit maximizing types into being entrepreneurs is a strong
argument for this modelling choice. However, we can allow for the principal to be inequity
averse, too. See the appendix for a brief outline of such a model. Assuming inequity
aversion on the principal’s side only strengthens our results as now both parties have a
preference for equitable distributions and are pushing for an equal sharing rule.
Our assumption of G (·) being convex differs slightly from the original exposition of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)14. While utility in their model is also additively separable in
income, effort and inequitable outcomes they describe the disutility caused by inequitable
outcomes in a piecewise linear way. Our formulation is analytically more convenient to
handle as we deal with continuously differentiable functions. However, the basic driv-
14They chose a piecewise linear model of the form Ui(xi) = xi−αi max{xj−xi, 0}−βi max{xi−xj , 0}.
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ing force of our model is present in their model, too. The agent is risk averse towards
lotteries over levels of inequity. Whilst our convex formulation makes the agent also lo-
cally averse towards such lotteries their piecewise linear formulation implies only global
aversion towards such lotteries.
Choosing the standard of comparison as comparing payoffs and equality to be the
reference point for an allocation to be considered as fair is an assumption that can be also
relaxed. The qualitative nature of our results remains entirely unchanged if we choose a
formulation where the agent considers a fixed share 1
k
of payoffs as fair or where the agent
desires a fixed share of the net rent, i.e. payoffs net of agent’s effort costs and any costs
borne by the principal15.
In contrast to standard contract theory models the assumption of an exogenously given
outside option is not without loss of generality. Using it here basically implies that the
agent no longer compares to the principal once he is not employed by him. Thus the
reference group is restricted to the firm. This is however empirically backed by Bewley
(2002).
One can ask whether focussing on the agent comparing himself to the principal and
not to the other agents16 is the appropriate thing to look at. We do not question the
fact that those intra worker comparisons are very important. However, we firmly believe
that workers indeed compare themselves to their superiors and, as Ed Lazear17 puts it
“...it is not obvious that workers should care more about harming other workers than they
do about harming capital owners” when they contemplate shirking. An example for the
importance of such vertical comparisons are the massive quarrels at American Airlines in
2003 that took place after the company had imposed massive wage cuts on the workers
to avoid bankruptcy and it became known that the executives had not participated in
these salary cuts. The unrest was explicitly pointed at this fact and American Airlines
CEO Donald Carty had to resign after it became public that executives had secured
their pension plans and claims from these cuts. Furthermore one has to note that all
15However cf. Young (1994) and Selten (1978) for detailed discussions of the non–trivial task to capture
equity in economic models.
16However, we deal with this case in the Extensions section.
17cf. Lazear (1995), p.49
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the important papers on the role of fairness from Akerlof (1982), over Rabin (1993), and
the numerous papers by Ernst Fehr and his collaborators were framed in a setting where
agents reciprocated towards their bosses.
Finally one could ask whether the relevant principals are really firm owners (as in our
model) or the managers. Our model allows for this interpretation also, as long as this
manager has discretion over the worker’s pay and the manager’s wealth depends on the
agent’s actions, e.g. via a stock option plan.
2.4 Contractible Effort
We start our analysis with the case where the principal can contract on effort, i.e. there
is no Moral Hazard problem present. In this situation the principal wants to maximize
his expected profit net of wage payments and has to obey only the agent’s participation
constraint (PC). Thus the problem becomes
max
e,w(x)
EUP =
x∫
x
f(x|e) [x− w(x)] dx
s.t. (PC) EUA =
x∫
x
f(x|e) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx− c(e) ≥ U.
Note that [x − 2w(x)] as the argument of G(·) is derived by simplifying the initial
comparison [(x − w(x)) − w(x)]. To isolate effects we first assume the agent to be risk
neutral with respect to variations in income, i.e. u (w(x)) = w(x).
In standard contracting models the contract structure in this setting is entirely unde-
termined. The principal is just interested in extracting all the rent from the relationship
and as there is no risk aversion as a source of deadweight loss he can do so with any
contract. However, introducing inequity aversion changes the picture.
Proposition 1 If effort is contractible and the agent is risk neutral in wealth the unique
optimal contract is linear with slope 1
2
.
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Figure 2.2: Forces at Work
The intuition for this result is that inequity aversion is the only source of welfare loss
in the problem. Similar to risk aversion the agent dislikes here variations in inequity.
Thus the deadweight loss can be minimized by offering a constant level of inequity over
all realizations of x, i.e. a linear contract with slope 1
2
. However, generically there will be
a welfare loss in equilibrium as the principal extracts the rent with a lump sum payment,
thus inflicting some inequity on the agent.
Corollary 2 Even with contractible effort and a risk neutral agent the welfare will not
be maximized due to a welfare loss through the inequitable allocation caused by the lump
sum component of the wage scheme.
Proposition 1 gives us the prerequisites to fully describe all the forces at work in our
model. Figure 2.2 shows these three forces. As in standard models the agent’s insurance
motive calls for a flat wage whilst the principal’s wish to provide incentives calls for a
wage scheme that makes the agent residual claimant. Finally, inequity aversion calls for
an equal sharing rule.
With this at hand we can enrich our model by introducing risk aversion for the agent.
In standard models of contract theory the solution is simply offering the agent a flat wage.
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As there is no need to provide incentives the principal just has to ensure that the agent
is fully insured.
Including now inequity aversion alters the situation. Looking at Figure 2.2 we see that
as there is not yet a need to provide incentives the optimal contract’s structure will be
determined in the interplay of risk aversion (calling for a flat wage) and inequity aversion
(calling for an equal sharing rule).
Proposition 3 If effort is contractible and the agent is risk averse the optimal contract
is strictly increasing with a slope of at most 1/2.
This shows that we should always observe some profit sharing, even if it is not necessary
for incentive reasons or when profits are not a good performance measure. Section 8
contains several observations backing this conjecture.
2.5 Non–Contractible Effort
Now we turn to the analysis of the classical Moral Hazard problem as we drop the as-
sumption that effort can be contracted upon. When designing the contract the principal
now has to keep in mind that the agent will act opportunistically and try to avoid effort
costs by shirking. Thus the optimal contract has to be self enforcing, i.e. the agent has
to find it in his own best interest to act as desired by the principal.
This incentive constraint (IC) the principal has to obey in addition to the above intro-
duced participation constraint has the form
(IC) e ∈ arg max
e˜
EUA =
x∫
x
f(x|e˜) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx− c(e˜)
and captures the fact that the agent will maximize his utility by choosing effort optimally
given the offered compensation scheme.
In order to solve the problem we rely – as standard in the literature – on the First
Order Approach and replace the above maximization problem in the principal’s problem
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by its first order condition
(IC ′) 0 =
x∫
x
fe(x|e)[u(w(x))− αG [x− 2w(x)]]dx− c′(e).
First we look again at the case of a risk neutral agent. The standard contracting model
(with a non–inequity averse agent) delivers a simple way to efficiently implement the first
best effort level: The principal simply “sells the firm to the agent”, i.e. offers a wage
scheme with slope one, making the agent residual claimant of all accruing profits. As
the agent is risk neutral he does not suffer from taking over the whole risk and as he is
residual claimant his incentives are socially efficient. The solution in the case with a risk
neutral but inequity averse agent looks different.
Proposition 4 If effort is not contractible and the agent is risk neutral the optimal con-
tract is strictly increasing with a slope between 1/2 and 1.
In the standard model there is nothing that would speak against making the agent
residual claimant. But now as the agent is inequity averse we note that making him resid-
ual claimant implies generically very unequal allocations and thus the degree of inequity
being very volatile. Therefore the need to give high incentives and the desire to insure the
agent against fluctuations in inequity work against each other and have to be balanced
off in the optimal contract.
As noted above in the standard model it is optimal to implement the full information
effort level also under Moral Hazard. Under inequity aversion this is not possible as we
have just one instrument, the slope of the wage scheme, to balance the need to incentivice
and the desire to insure against varying degrees of inequity.
Proposition 5 If effort is not contractible the full information effort level is not imple-
mented though the agent is risk neutral
This hints again at the fact that inequity aversion is a friction similar to risk aversion
that acts as a source of welfare loss in the model. If the principal gave higher powered
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incentives that would lead to too inequitable allocations for which the agent would have
to be compensated up front. Thus incentives are distorted downwards. However, it is not
clear whether effort under inequity aversion will be lower than in the standard case as in
some cases the agent will want to work harder as he also suffers if the principal is worse
off than he is.
Now we approach the fully fledged problem and allow for risk aversion in the agent’s
preferences. Already in the standard model, where only the motive to insure the agent
against fluctuations in wealth and the need to provide sufficient incentives are present,
there is no clear cut prediction for the shape of the optimal incentive scheme, next to it
being strictly increasing. This is due to the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property which
tells us that a higher profit level is informative with respect to the agent’s effort choice. If
we now turn to the analysis of our model where we additionally have to take into account
the agent’s concern for equity the situation gets even more complicated. Thus we cannot
make a very sharp prediction either.
Proposition 6 If effort is not contractible and the agent is risk averse the optimal con-
tract is strictly increasing.
Now one instrument has to balance off three countervailing forces and the shape of the
scheme is determined by their interplay. We know that the scheme is increasing for two
reasons: As in the standard model higher profit levels are informative signals and are
therefore used to reward the agent. But additionally the agent cares for an increasing
wage scheme for reasons of fair sharing.
Exploiting this latter reasons allows us to state that if the agent’s concern for fairness
is strong enough we get an increasing wage scheme no matter whether high profit levels
are informative or not.
Proposition 7 For any given signal quality there exits a value for α, the agent’s concern
for equity, such that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property is not needed to ensure the
optimal contract being strictly increasing in x.
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2.6 Comparative Static Properties
To be able to be more precise with respect to the contractual structure we analyze the
comparative static properties of our results. First we analyze what happens if the agent’s
concern for equity, captured by α, increases.
Proposition 8 If α, the agent’s concern for equity increases the optimal contract con-
verges to w(x) = 1/2x, i.e. the equal split.
If α increases, at some point this concern for equity becomes the dominant driving force
for the structure of the contract and overrules all other motives. To the agent it is more
important to ensure equity than to avoid risk and to the principal it is just too expensive
to provide incentives over the equal split - as this would imply inequitable allocations at
least sometimes. To compensate the agent for this risk then becomes prohibitively costly.
Looking at the comparative statics with respect to x shows another interesting property.
Proposition 9 As the realized profit level increases the optimal contract specifies a more
equitable distribution of overall profit18.
Thus inequity aversion is not only another friction but also delivers an additional in-
centive instrument. The effect is most pronounced under risk neutrality and under risk
aversion if the agent is already generously compensated in monetary terms. In this case
the additional utility from decreased inequity is more important than additional monetary
compensation and makes reduced inequity a possibly valuable source of incentives.
This concludes the analysis of the basic model and we turn to the analysis of some
extensions.
18The paper by Rey Biel (2002) uses a related effect.
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2.7 Extensions
2.7.1 Overdetermined Contracts
As pointed out above, inequity aversion is one reason why the agent is inherently interested
in how the profits are divided - not only via the channel of its informative use in incentive
provision. To prove this consider the following setup: The firms’ profit Π can be separated
into two parts x and y, i.e. Π = x+y. While the distribution of x depends on the effort e
exerted by the agent, y is purely randomly distributed. In the appendix it is shown that
contrary to the well known sufficient statistics result, the optimal contract when the agent
exhibits inequity aversion conditions on y, although this variable contains no information
concerning the effort choice.
Proposition 10 With inequity averse agents the sufficient statistics result no longer ap-
plies. Optimal contracts may be overdetermined, i.e. contain non relevant information
with respect to effort choice.
The intuition is along the lines of Proposition 1. Profit serves not only as a signal
whether or not the agent exerted enough effort, but is also important for the agent’s
utility as he has a concern for equitable distributions. As the agent compares his payoff
to the firm’s profit, y is taken into account when equitability is judged. Therefore it has
to be taken into account when the contract is written. If this is not done one ends up
with too much inequity for which the agent has to be compensated upfront.
2.7.2 Incomplete Contracts
In economic theory much more attention has been paid to incomplete contracts than to
overdetermined contracts. Interestingly our model can also account for incompleteness.
Suppose we have the following situation. The principal has now not only access to profit x
but also to another more direct performance measure m. The signal m contains additional
information on the agent’s effort choice and should be therefore – following Holmstro¨m’s
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[1979] Sufficient Statistics Result – included in the optimal contract. In our set up this is
not necessarily the case.
Corollary 11 If α, the agent’s concern for equity, converges to ∞ the optimal contract
is uniquely defined by w(x) = 1
2
x and additional informative signals are disregarded. Thus
the optimal contract is incomplete.
Note that this holds even for the extreme case where the signal x is dominated in the
sense of Second Order Stochastic Dominance by signal m. The idea behind this result is
again that the improved incentives cannot compensate for the fact that the agent now has
to be compensated for less equitable allocations. Therefore it might be better to forego
the chance to use superior performance measures and instead stick to profit in which the
agent is intrinsically interested19.
2.7.3 Team Incentives
Another natural extension is to analyze what happens if there is not only one agent but
many as inequity aversion should be also important when agents interact with peers.
Suppose there is one principal and two agents. The agents’ tasks are technologically in-
dependent. Each agent has to choose an effort level ei to influence a distribution function
fi(xi|ei) where xi is the profit generated from agent i’s project. Only the xi are con-
tractible. The agents compare each others’ gross payoff and the principal’s payoff. The
principal offers a contract wi (x1, x2) that can in principle depend on both performance
measures.
19Note that if net–of–effort payoffs are compared this result no longer holds as now agents have not only
an intrinsic interest in profit but also in effort (via effort costs). Thus the contract will always condition
on all available sufficient statistics with respect to effort choice.
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Agent 1’s utility function takes the form
EUA1 =
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
f1(x|e1)f2(x|e2)u1 (w1 (·))− αP G [[(x1 + x2)− (w2 (·) + w1 (·))]− w1 (·)]
−αAH [w2 (·)− w1 (·)] dx1dx2 − c(e)
=
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
f1(x|e1)f2(x|e2)u1 (w1 (·))− αP G [x1 + x2 − w2 (·)− 2w1 (·)]
−αAH [w2 (·)− w1 (·)] dx1dx2 − c(e).
αP measures how much weight he puts on the comparison towards the principal. The
agent now suffers if his payoff w1 (·) differs from the principal’s gross payoff (x1 + x2)
net of total wage payments (w2 (·) + w1 (·)) . The disutility is – as in the basic model –
captured by a convex function G (·) . The agent also suffers if his payoff w1 (·) differs from
his co–worker’s payoff w2 (·) . His concern for equity towards the other agent is weighted
by αP and measured by the convex function H (·).
As before the agent is risk averse against variations in equity towards his co–worker.
The optimal contract takes care of this.
Proposition 12 If agents are inequity averse there is a rationale for team incentives even
if tasks are technologically independent and there is a sufficient statistic for every agent.
Standard theory would suggest that if there is no technological link between agents’
tasks and therefore no scope for relative performance evaluation to filter out common
shocks, conditioning pay on other agents’ output only adds noise. Following the Sufficient
Statistics result the principal should therefore not condition upon such uninformative
signals. But inequity averse agents have an intrinsic interest in other agents’ performance.
Conditioning pay on others’ performance ensures that there is not too much inequity
among the workers. This reduces the compensation agents demand for the risk of facing
inequitable allocations and hence reduces the principal’s costs. It is again the tradeoff
between optimal incentive provision and ensuring equity that drives this result. Focussing
on the extreme case where inequity aversion is the sole driving force we get a very simple
contractual structure.
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Corollary 13 If agents’ concern for equity among them becomes very large (αA → ∞)
the optimal contract is a simple team contract basing each agent’s pay solely on overall
profit.
Related to this issue is an observation by Bartling and von Siemens (2004b). They
argue that keeping salaries secret can never be optimal as it would limit the possibilities
to insure the agent against variations in income as compared to his co–workers.
2.8 Empirical Evidence
Our first central finding is, that the distribution of profits within a firm actually matters
when agents are inequity averse. Rotemberg (2003) has several examples that clearly
show that agents are very much interested in their companies’ profits and the distribution
of the produced rents. Lord and Hohenfeld (1979) report a study of major league baseball
players who became “free agents”20 in one season where club owners had made use of an
option to cut wages by 20%. After this wage cut these players’ – beforehand better–than–
average – performance declined significantly, only to go up again after they had signed
with new clubs. While standard theory would predict that performance should go up
if the agent is looking for a new job to signal his high ability to the market, models of
reciprocity are in line with this behavior. In our framework the declining performance
can be seen as a means of the players to lower owner’s profits in order to equalize shares
of profits after the 20% cut.
Greenberg (1993) reports a field experiment in several plants of a firm where theft
after a cut in wages was measured. In those plants where wages were cut “with no good
reason” theft went up significantly. This study controls for the argument that a theory of
efficiency wages could explain this finding21. Taking into account social preferences allows
us to interpret the increase in theft as the employees stealing back what they view their
fair share. In a similar vein we can interpret Bewley’s (1999) finding that the productivity
20A professional athlete who is free to sign a contract to play for any team.
21By the wage cut the value of retaining the job declines and thus the worker is more willing to take
the risk of getting caught stealing and loosing the job.
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loss in a firm after a wage cut is stronger in boom times, i.e. when firms’ profits are high,
than in a downturn when firms run losses22.
In a meta study Thaler (1989) reports systematic and persistent inter industry wage
differentials, i.e. an equally qualified worker in the same job earns significantly more
in a high profit industry. The papers by Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) and
Hildreth and Oswald (1997) find the same and additionally the intertemporal effect that
increased firm profits feed through to wage increases. Whilst these facts are contradicting
standard labor market theories they are again consistent with fairness based theories of
rent sharing.
Our second central result is the tendency towards linear and equal sharing rules implied
by agents exhibiting inequity aversion. Taking a global perspective the most widespread
incentive contracts are sharecropping contracts. As empirical studies by Bardhan and
Rudra (1980), Bardhan (1984), Young (1996) and Young and Burke (2001) from India and
Illinois find those are predominantly linear. Moreover 60% to 90% of these sharecropping
contracts stipulate equal splitting rules. Allen (1985) states that “metayage”, the French
word for sharecropping, actually means “dividing in half”. The same holds for the Italian
term “mezzadria”.
Now let us turn to the analysis of contractual completeness. While it is hardly ques-
tioned that real world contracts are predominantly incomplete there has been less focus
on overdetermination of contracts. There are several sources showing the widespread use
of employee stock and stock options also for lower tier workers. For example CISCO
Systems has such schemes for every single employee and is a very successful company in
terms of profit and in terms of retaining their workforce. At Starbucks even part time
workers are entitled to such schemes. A 1987 US Government Accounting Office survey
shows that 54% of non-unionized and 39% of unionized Fortune 1,000 firms had firm wide
profit sharing plans in place. Knez and Simester (2001) report the enormous success of
Continental Airlines that introduced a firmwide profit sharing scheme. Their economet-
ric study showed that the increases in productivity can be largely accounted for by this
profit sharing plan. The study by Oyer and Schaefer (2003) shows in addition that the
adoption of broad based employee stock and stock option plans is much more common
22Cf. Bewley (1999), p. 203 tables 12.4 and 12.5.
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in smaller firms. If one is willing to accept that in smaller groups social comparisons are
more important this points at a fairness based interpretation. These findings fit in our
analysis as inequity averse workers are interested in profit sharing plans inherently - even
if these stock and stock options are not good performance measures as a single lower tier
worker’s influence on the stock price is certainly negligible23.
These findings, however, also hold for top tier employees. Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) find that CEO income reacts equally strongly to “lucky” and to “general” profits,
where lucky profits are those not controllable by the CEO. Furthermore they find that
in firms with “anti–takeover–clauses” (that protect the CEO) not only the CEO earns
more, but also all other employees. So whilst the finding on CEO income could also be
interpreted a la Bebchuk and Fried (2003) as the CEO – who basically can freely set his
own pay – just diverting money from the shareholders to herself, the latter finding is very
much in line with a theory of an inequity averse workforce that demands to be taken care
of fairly.
Finally our analysis of teams fits the study by Agell (2003) who finds that there are
systematic differences in pay structure between large and small firms where small firms
have less competitive schemes in place. Taking it again as given that in smaller groups
social comparisons are more important this fits our results that with multiple agents
compensation should be rather team then relative performance based.
2.9 Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that incorporating social preferences in the analysis of optimal
incentives can improve our understanding of real world incentive schemes a lot. If agents
exhibit an aversion towards inequitable distributions the optimal contract has to bal-
ance the agent’s concern for insurance and fairness and the principal’s desire to provide
adequate incentives.
The agent’s concern for equity adds a rationale for linear sharing rules and it adds an
23Moreover is stockholding in the own company bad from a portfolio composition perspective as this
is highly correlated with risks to a employee’s (firm specific) human capital.
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additional incentive instrument: the agent can be rewarded for better performance not
only by paying more, but also by paying more equitably. Due to the inherent interest in
the distribution of profits, Holmstro¨m’s Suffcient Statistics result is violated and optimal
contracts may be either overdetermined or even incomplete. Along the same lines of
reasoning we get a rationale for team incentives even if tasks are independent. Thus,
introducing inequity aversion into the analysis of contracting problems offers a plausible
explanation for an array of empirical phenomena at once.
However, our analysis is only a first step in the - as we believe - right direction and
there remain many open questions to be tackled. If social preferences are important and
matter for effort exertion and incentive provision it would naturally be of importance
for firms to be able to alter them. And Milgrom and Roberts (1992) already point out
that a large share of companies’ Human Resource Management activities is targeted at
shaping employees preferences. While this question is central to researchers in Organiza-
tional Behavior or Human Resource Management it has received only little attention by
economists24.
A related question is, how an interaction is perceived by the agent. What is the relevant
time horizon, what are the limits of a relation? Psychologists would call this “bracketing”.
The right framing of the work interaction is surely another important task for managers
within a firm.
Another interesting question is whether there is sorting with respect to the “fairness
type” in the labor market. Casciaro (2001) reports that people can detect whether others
have social feelings towards them and O’Reilly and Pfeffer (1995) and Oliva and Gittell
(2002) report about Southwest Airlines that apparently uses this and hired only after
checking for social type. In Southwest’s hiring process these social factors were more
important than ability or past performance. So it remains to be determined for what jobs
or tasks socially motivated workers are especially desirable or detrimental.
Finally it is important to understand, what determines the reference group for social
comparison processes. As relative income comparisons have the above described effects on
incentives and effort it is important to control to whom agents compare such that ill-led
24Rotemberg (1994) is one prominent exception, although his focus is slightly different.
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comparisons do not lead to detrimental outcomes.
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2.10 Appendix
2.10.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The principal’s problem is given by
max
e,w(x)
EUP =
x∫
x
f(x | e) [x− w(x)] dx
s.t.(PC) EUA =
x∫
x
f(x | e) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx− c(e) ≥ U
and the Lagrangian takes the form
L =
x∫
x
f(x|e) [x− w(x)] dx
−λ
U − x∫
x
f(x|e) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx + c(e)

The First Order Condition is then given by
∂L
∂w(x)
= −f(x|e) + λf(x|e)ux (w(x)) + λf(x|e)2αG′ [x− 2w(x)] = 0.
Dividing by f(x|e) and rearranging yields
λu′ (w(x))− 1
λ2α
= G′ [x− 2w(x)] .
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Note that for risk neutral agents u′ (w(x)) is a constant: u′ (w(x)) = u
λu− 1
λ2α
= G′ [x− 2w(x)]
λu− 1
λ2α
= const.
=⇒
Gx [x− 2w(x)] = const.
⇔
x− 2w(x) = const.(due to convexity of G [x− 2w(x)] )
⇔
w(x) =
const.
2
+
x
2
Proof of Proposition 3
The principal’s problem, the Lagrangian and the first order condition look like above
and can be rewritten as
−1 + λ [u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]] = 0.
Totally differentiating this expression yields
0 = w′(x)u′′(w(x)) + 2αG′′ (·) (1− 2w′(x))
w′(x) =
[2αG′′ (·)]− [1
2
u′′ (w(x))− 1
2
u′′ (w(x))
]
(4αG′′ (·)− u′′ (w(x)))
w′(x) =
2αG′′ (·)− 1
2
u′′ (w(x))
4αG′′ (·)− u′′ (w(x))
+
1
2
u′′ (w(x))
4αG′′ (·)− u′′ (w(x))
w′(x) =
1
2
+
u′′ (w(x))
(8αG′′ (·)− 2u′′ (w(x))) .
Note that
u′′ (w(x))
(8αG′′ (·)− 2u′′ (w(x))) < 0
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as
u′′ (w(x)) < 0.
Thus
w′(x) <
1
2
holds.
Proof of Proposition 4
Now the principal has to take care of the agent’s incentive constraint. Thus his problem
is given by
max
e,w(x)
EUP =
x∫
x
f(x|e) [x− w(x)] dx
s.t.(PC) EUA =
x∫
x
f(x|e) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx− c(e) ≥ U
(IC) e ∈ arg max
e˜
EUA =
x∫
x
f(x|e˜) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx− c(e˜)
(IC′) 0 =
x∫
x
fe(x|e)[u(w(x))− αG [x− 2w(x)]]dx− c′(e)
where the Lagrangian takes the form
L =
x∫
x
f(x|e) [x− w(x)] dx
−λ
U − x∫
x
f(x|e) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx + c(e)

−µ
0− x∫
x
fe(x | e)[u(w(x))− αG [x− 2w(x)]]dx + c′(e)
 .
2.10. APPENDIX 31
The resulting first order condition can be divided by f(x|e) and rewritten to[
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
[u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]]− 1 = 0.
Totally differentiating with respect to x yields
0 = [u′′ (w(x)) w′(x) + 2αG′′ [x− 2w(x)] (1− 2w′(x))]
+µ
(
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
)′
[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
] [u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]] .
Note that due to risk neutrality u′′ (w(x)) = 0 and u′ (w(x)) is a constant. Thus we get
w′(x) =
1
2
+
µ
(
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
)′
[u′(w(x))+2αG′[x−2w(x)]]
[λ+µ fe(x|e)f(x|e) ]
4αG′′ [x− 2w(x)]
where all terms but
[u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]][
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
are obviously positive. To ensure that
[u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]][
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
is positive, too, check again the first order condition:[
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
[u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]]− 1 = 0
⇔
[u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]] = 1[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
] .
This is only possible if the both terms [u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]] and
[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
have the same sign. Thus all terms from above are strictly positive and w′(x) > 1
2
holds.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Note that here - in contrast to standard principal agent models - the optimal First Best
contract is unique. The Lagrangian of the First Best Problem has the form
L = E[UP (x− w(x))|e]− λ[UA − E[UA|e]]
The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to effort yields
∂L
∂e
=
∂E[UP (x− w(x))|e]
∂e
+ λ
∂E[UA|e]
∂e
= 0
The second expression is the derivative of the agent’s incentive constraint and therefore
has to be zero in optimum in the Second Best case. If we plug in the First Best wage
scheme, which according to Proposition 1 has the form w∗(x) = γ + 1/2x, the term
∂E[UP (x−w(x))|e]
∂e
changes to 1/2∂E[x|e]
∂e
, which has to be zero in order to guarantee the First
Best solution if the Incentive Constraint holds in the Second Best. But, as we assumed
c(e) > 0, it can not be an equilibrium if ∂E[x|e]
∂e
|e=eFB is equal to zero, as we could reduce
the effort, and hence c(e) without reducing the expected value of x. Therefore ∂E[UA|e]
∂e
6= 0
must hold, which means that the First Best effort level is not implementable in the Second
Best.
Proof of Proposition 6
The principal’s problem, the Lagrangian and the first order condition look like in the
proof of Proposition 3. The latter can be written as[
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
[u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]]− 1 = 0.
Totally differentiating this expression with respect to x yields
0 =
[
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
[u′′ (w(x)) w′(x) + 2αG′′ [x− 2w(x)] (1− 2w′(x))]
+µ
(
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
)′
[u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]] .
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which can be rearranged to
w′(x) =
2αG′′ [x− 2w(x)]
[4αG′′ [x− 2w(x)]− u′′ (w(x))]
+
µ
(
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
)′
[u′ (w(x)) + 2αG′ [x− 2w(x)]][
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
[4αG′′ [x− 2w(x)]− u′′ (w(x))]
.
As all terms are strictly positive (see the proof of Proposition 3 which shows that the
last term has to be positive) it holds that w′(x) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7
Taking the limit for α → ∞ in the proof of Proposition 7 implies the proposition as
the slope of 1
2
is independent of the signal quality.
Proof of Proposition 8
We will check that for all the treated combinations of risk neutrality, risk aversion, effort
contractibility and effort non–contractibility. Consider all the first order conditions:
Contractible effort and risk neutral agent
G′ [x− 2w(x)] = 1
2α
[
λu− 1
λ
]
Contractible effort and risk averse agent
G′ [x− 2w(x)] = 1
2α
[
1
λ
− u′ (w(x))
]
Non–contractible effort and risk neutral agent
G′ [x− 2w(x)] = 1
2α
 1[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
] − u′ (w(x))

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Non–contractible effort and risk averse agent
G′ [x− 2w(x)] = 1
2α
 1[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
] − u′ (w(x))

For all these cases for α →∞ the limit of G′ [x− 2w(x)] is 0, i.e.
lim
α→∞
G′ [x− 2w(x)] = 0.
This implies a linear contract of the form w(x) = 1
2
x.
Proof of Proposition 9
Remember that the first order condition can be written as
G′ [x− 2w(x)] = 1
2α
 1[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
] − u′ (w(x))

If x increases fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
goes up (as we assumed Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property) and
the whole latter term goes down. Thus the absolute value of G′ (·) decreases, in term
implying a lower degree of inequity.
Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose the firms’ profit Π can be separated into two parts x and y, i.e. Π = x + y.
While the distribution f(x | e) of x depends on the effort e exerted by the agent, y is
purely randomly distributed and its density is given by g(y). To show that the sufficient
statistics result does not apply when the agent exhibits inequity aversion consider the
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principal’s optimization problem
max EUP =
x∫
x
f(x|e)xdx +
y∫
y
g(y)ydy −
x∫
x
y∫
y
w(x, y)f(x|e)g(y)dxdy
s.t.(PC) U ≤
x∫
x
y∫
y
{u (w(x, y))− αG[x + y − 2w(x, y)]}f(x|e)g(y)dxdy − c(e)
s.t.(IC) e ∈ arg max
e˜
x∫
x
y∫
y
{u[w(x, y)]− αG[x + y − 2w(x, y)]}f(x|e˜)g(y)dxdy − c(e˜)
(IC′) 0 =
x∫
x
y∫
y
fe(x|e)g(y)[u[w(x, y)− αG[x + y − 2w(x, y)]]dxdy − ce(e)
where g(y) is the density function for y, the random part of the profit.
The Lagrangian is given by
L =
x∫
x
f(x | e)xdx +
y∫
y
g(y)ydy −
x∫
x
y∫
y
w(x, y)f(x | e)g(y)dxdy
−λ
U − x∫
x
y∫
y
{u[w(x, y)]− αG[x + y − 2w(x, y)]}f(x | e)g(y)dxdy + c(e)

−µ
0− x∫
x
y∫
y
fe(x | e)g(y)[u[w(x, y)− αG[x + y − 2w(x, y)]]dxdy + ce(e)
 .
The first order condition for the principal’s optimization problem has the following form
−1 + λ [u′[w(x, y)] + 2αG′(·)] + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e) [u
′[w(x, y)] + 2αG′[·]] = 0.
An application of the implicit function theorem yields
∂w
∂y
=
αG′′[·]
4αG′′[·]− u′′[w(x, y)] 6= 0 ∀ α 6= 0.
As w depends on y, which does not contain any information about the agent’s effort choice
the sufficient statistics result does not apply. Not surprisingly, for α = 0, i.e. a purely
selfish agent, the sufficient statistics result applies again, as there wy(y) = 0 holds.
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Proof of Corollary 11
The proof follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 7. For α →∞ the optimal
contract is uniquely determined by w(x) = 1
2
x, no matter whether effort is contractible
or not. Thus effort is disregarded.
Proof of Proposition 12
For the case with two agents the utility of agent 1 is given by
EUA1 =
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
f1(x1|e1)f2(x2|e2)[u1 (w1 (·))− αP G [[x1 + x2 − w2 (·)− w1 (·)]− w1 (·)]
−αAH [w2 (·)− w1 (·)]]dx1dx2 − c(e)
=
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
f1(x1|e1)f2(x2|e2)[u1 (w1 (·))− αP G [x1 + x2 − w2 (·)− 2w1 (·)]
−αAH [w2 (·)− w1 (·)]]dx1dx2 − c(e)
where w1 (·) = w1 (x1, x2) and w1 (·) = w2 (x1, x2) .
Thus the principal’s problem takes the form
max
e,w(x)
EUP =
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
f1(x1|e1)f2(x2|e2) [x1 + x2 − w2 (·)− w1 (·)] dx1dx2
s.t.(PC) EUA =
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
f1(x1|e1)f2(x2|e2)[u1 (w1 (·))− αP G (·)− αAH (·)]dx1dx2 − c(e1) ≥ U
(IC) e ∈ arg max
e
EUA =
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
fi(xi|ei)fj(xj|ej)[ui (wi (·))− αP G (·)− αAH (·)]dx1dx2 − c(ei)
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
(IC′) 0 =
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
fiei (xi|ei)fj(xj|ej)[ui (wi (xi, xj))− αP G (·)− αAH (·)]dx1dx2 − c′(ei)
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and the Lagrangian becomes
L =
x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
f1(x1|e1)f1(x1|e2) [x1 + x2 − w2 (x1, x2)− w1 (x1, x2)] dx1dx2
−λ
U − x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
f1(x1|e1)f2(x2|e2)[u1 (w1 (x1, x2))− αP G [·]− αAH (·)]dx1dx2 + c(e1)

−µ
0− x1∫
x1
x2∫
x2
fiei (xi|ei)fj(xj|ej)[u1 (w1 (x1, x2))− αP G (·)− αAH (·)]dx1dx2 + c′(e1)
 .
The first order condition can be written as[
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
[u′1 (w1 (x1, x2)) + 2αP G
′ (·) + αAH ′ (·)]− 1 = 0.
Differentiating this expression with respect to x2 yields
[u′′1 (w1 (·)) w1x2 (·) + 2αP G′′ [·] (1− w2x2 (·)− 2w1x2 (·)) + αAH ′′ (·) (w2x2 (·)− w1x2 (·))] = 0
which we can solve for ∂w1(·)
∂x2
:
∂w1 (·)
∂x2
=
w2x2 (·) [2αP G′′ (·)− αAH ′′ (·)]− 2αP G′′ (·)
u′′1 (w1 (·))− 4αP G′′ (·)− αAH ′′ (·)
.
This is generically non zero. Thus we know
∂w1 (·)
∂x2
6= 0
as implied by the Proposition. The same logic applies for the N agent case.
Proof of Corollary 13
From above we know
w1x2 (·) =
w2x2 (·) [2αP G′′ (·)− αAH ′′ (·)]− 2αP G′′ (·)
u′′1 (w1 (·))− 4αP G′′ (·)− αAH ′′ (·)
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where wixj denotes the derivative of wi(·) with respect to xj.
Applying L’Hospital’s Rule
lim
αA→∞
f(x)
g(x)
= lim
αA→∞
f ′(x)
g′(x)
we get
lim
αA→∞
w1x2 (·) = w2x2 (·)
and analoguously we get
lim
αA→∞
w1x1 (·) = w2x1 (·) .
This however implies that w1x1 (·) = w1x2 (·) = w1x (·) .
2.10.2 The Problem for an inequity averse principal
The principal’s problem is only slightly changed due to his changed objective function,
now including a part capturing his suffering from inequitable allocations, −βH[2w(x)−x].
For this part the same assumptions as on G (·) apply.
max
e,w(x)
EUP =
x∫
x
f(x | e) [[(x− w(x)]− βH[2w(x)− x]] dx
s.t.(PC) EUA =
x∫
x
f(x | e) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx− c(e) ≥ U
(IC) e ∈ arg max
e
EUA =
x∫
x
f(x | e) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x)]] dx− c(e)
(IC ′) 0 =
x∫
x
fe(x | e)[u(w(x))− αG [x− 2w(x)]]dx− c′(e)
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The resulting first order condition of this problem can be written as
−1− 2βH ′[2w(x)− x] +
([
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
])
(u′[w(x, y)] + 2αG′[x− 2w(x)]) = 0.
Differentiating this first order condition yields after rearranging
∂w
∂x
=
2βH ′′(·) + 2αG′′[·]
[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
+ µ
(
fe(x,y|e)
f(x,y|e)
)′
(u′[w(x, y)] + 2αG′[x− 2w(x)])
4βH ′′[·] + 4αG′′(·)
[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
−
[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
u′′[w(x, y)]
.
We see that α and β, i.e. agent and principal fairness attitudes work in the same
direction.
2.10.3 The Problem with inequity aversion defined over net
rents
The preferences of the agent are given by
EUA =
x∫
x
f(x | e){u (w(x))− αG[[x− w(x)]− [w(x)− u−1 (c(e))]]}dx− c(e)
⇔
EUA =
x∫
x
f(x | e){u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x) + u−1 (c(e))]}dx− c(e)
The change here is now that the agent no longer compares gross payments
[[x− w(x)]− w(x)] but corrects for his effort costs measured in monetary units
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[[x− w(x)]− [w(x)− u−1 (c(e))]] . Thus the principal’s problem takes the form
max
e,w(x)
EUP =
x∫
x
f(x|e)[(x− w(x)]dx
s.t.(PC) EUA =
x∫
x
f(x|e){u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x) + u−1 (c(e))]}dx− c(e) ≥ U
(IC) e ∈ arg max
e
EUA =
x∫
x
f(x|e) [u (w(x))− αG[x− 2w(x) + u−1 (c(e))]] dx− c(e)
(IC ′) 0 =
x∫
x
fe(x|e)[u(w(x))− αG(x− 2w(x) + u−1 (c(e)))]dx
−
x∫
x
f(x|e)αG′[x− 2w(x) + u−1 (c(e))]u−1′ (c(e)) c′(e)dx− c′(e)
The resulting first order condition is
−1 +
[
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
]
[u′[w(x)] + 2αG′(·)]− µ2αG′′[·]u−1′ (c(e)) c′(e) = 0
which we can solve for
G′[·] = 1
2α
1 + µ2αG′′[·]u−1′ (c(e)) c′(e)[
λ + µfe(x|e)
f(x|e)
] − u′[w(x)]

and
w′(x) =
1
2
+
1
2
u′′(w(x)) + µ
( fe(x,y|e)f(x,y|e) )
′
[u′[w(x)]+2αG′[·]]
[λ+µ fe(x,y|e)f(x,y|e) ]
4αG′′(·)− u′′[w(x)] +
4αG′′′[·]u−1′ (c(e)) c′(e)
[4αG′′[·]− u′′[w(x)]]
[
λ + µfe(x,y|e)
f(x,y|e)
] .
Compare this to the solution of the standard problem
w′(x) =
1
2
+
1
2
u′′(w(x)) + µ
( fe(x|e)f(x|e) )
′
[u′(w(x))+2αG′(·)]
[λ+µ fe(x|e)f(x|e) ]
4αG′′ (·)− u′′ (w(x))
and note that the basic structure is very similar to the original problem as it differs
only by one additively separable term.
Chapter 3
Moral Hazard and Inequity
Aversion: A Survey
3.1 Introduction
This paper provides a non-technical survey of recent contributions to the emerging field of
behavioral contract theory that try to incorporate social preferences into the analysis of
optimal contracts in situations of Moral Hazard. The presence of these social preferences
is confirmed by numerous studies. Taking them into account when analyzing optimal
contracts generates important new insights, and might help us gain a better understanding
of real world contracts and organizational structures.
A central question that economists have been facing for a long time is how to give
workers the right incentives to motivate them to perform as desired by the principal. Over
the years, the Moral Hazard problem has become one of the most intensely analyzed. As
a result, many insights have been gained and the problem also seems to be one of the best
understood in economics.
Having said this, the theory has an important shortcoming. Real world contracts seldom
look like those predicted by theory. Often contracts are linear and simpler, incentives are
sometimes more high powered or the wage schedule more compressed than expected. And
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some features, such as the widespread use of employee stock option plans, seem somewhat
bewildering.
One reason for this shortcoming may be that economic theorists have based their models
on the assumption that the agent is a solely self interested homo economicus. Although
this is often a good working assumption, in the specific context of labor relations it misses
out on some important aspects like social ties, team spirit or work morale, which appear
fundamental to researchers and practitioners in the field of human resources. With some
notable exceptions, this gap between economic theory and research in human resources is
only now beginning to close.
Kandel and Lazear (1992) in an early theoretical paper, try to incorporate social re-
lations into a formal model. They model “peer pressure“ where co-workers inflict social
sanctions on agents who fall short of some norm. As an additional instrument to provide
incentives, peer pressure is efficiency enhancing. This can have implications for a firm’s
policy. Kandel and Lazear highlight the importance of profit sharing plans as well as
“spirit building activities“ as means of enhancing the power of peer pressure.
Similarly, Rotemberg (1994) examines whether it may be optimal to develop altruistic
preferences in a working relation. In his model, agents can choose whether to be altruistic
towards their co-workers. Although intuitively that never seems to be an optimal thing
to do, in fact it may be beneficial, since altruism gives commitment power. In a team
production setting with strategic complementarities, they can now commit to exert a high
level of effort as it is now in their best interest to do so. Hence in such settings the efficient
outcome can be realized if agents can choose to become altruistic beforehand. It may thus
be good for firms to give their workers the chance to develop altruistic feelings towards
each other, such as by socializing a lot.
All these papers use a somewhat ad hoc specification of not solely self-centered pref-
erences. But recently experimental and field evidence has helped to amend the standard
utility function and move it to a sounder footing, and to develop extensive form models
of social preferences. Further below we will discuss several of these amendments. How-
ever, Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model serves as a reference point in most of the papers
presented in this survey.
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The present paper is modest in scope and will only address the theoretical contribu-
tions to the moral hazard problem. It will not address experimental work on incentive
provision1. Neither will it address other informational problems such as Adverse Selection.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section two the paper spells out
why social preferences can add valuable insights to the analysis of incentive provision and
how to model these social preferences. Section three analyzes the standard one–agent–
one–principal problem, as studied by Holmstro¨m (1979). The exposition here follows
Englmaier and Wambach (2002). Section four then turns to a special case of multi-
agent settings, tournaments, while section five deals with team production problems. The
concluding section six outlines some promising topics for future research.
3.2 Social Preferences - Evidence and Modelling
Approaches
Akerlof (1982) was probably the first to point to the importance of social preferences for
labor market outcomes in a theoretical model. He characterized labor relations as a form
of gift exchange. In a situation where we cannot contract effort, the employer offers the
employee a generous wage, hoping that the employee will reciprocate this “gift“ with more
than minimum effort. In a subsequent paper, Akerlof and Yellen (1988) argue that the
resulting market clearing wages may account for equilibrium unemployment.
These arguments are experimentally backed by two papers: Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and
Riedl (1993) and Fehr, Ga¨chter, and Kirchsteiger (1997). In experiments, these authors
replicate labour markets and confirm the results of Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen
(1988). In their data they show that there is a positive relation between wage offers by
firms and work effort responses by workers. And firms seem to understand the possibility
of triggering effort by this means, since they make deliberate and extensive use of it. As
a result, even in competitive double auction environments, the wage level remains above
the market clearing level, resulting in involuntary unemployment2.
1Cf. e.g. Ga¨chter and Fehr (2001) on that.
2In the sense that for the current wage level jobless workers would have been willing to work.
44 CHAPTER 3. MORAL HAZARD AND INEQUITY AVERSION
There is a great deal more experimental evidence on the importance of social preferences
for incentive provision. See the references in Fehr and Falk (2002), Fehr and Schmidt
(2003), and Ga¨chter and Fehr (2001) for an overview. Important additional evidence is
also provided by Bewley (1999) who undertook an extensive survey. He asked a large
number of managers their opinions on wage cuts and other pay policies. These interviews
clearly highlight that managers fear a breakdown of working morale if they make use of
an adverse labor market situation in an “unfair“ manner and cut wages.
Given this evidence, it is no surprise that there have been several attempts to amend
standard theory with social preferences. Rabin (1993) tries to incorporate fairness into
game theory. In his model of a static simultaneous move game, individual utility depends
on a belief about the other’s intentions. If you believe that your opponent wants to do
something in your favor, your utility increases by returning this favor. If, however, you
believe that your opponent will hurt you, the optimal response is to retaliate. One can
easily see that there are generally multiple equilibria sustained by self-fulfilling prophecies.
A good one, where each believes that the opponent has good intentions and where these
expectations are met in equilibrium, and a bad one where each player believes the other to
be evil-minded and this belief again is met in equilibrium. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(forthcoming) extend Rabin’s paper to sequential games and Falk and Fischbacher (2000)
is another attempt at a general model. The equilibrium predictions of these models
crucially depend on a player’s belief about the other player’s intentions. This is tricky
to deal with and inherently hard to test empirically or experimentally. Therefore models
have been developed that try to capture social preferences while only placing observable
variables such as monetary outcomes, as conditions.
Generally, in these models there is a separable term added to standard utility which
captures relative income comparisons. Agents suffer a utility loss if they do not get
their “fair“ share of total output, that is, if the allocation is “inequitable“. For most
experimental settings inequity can be replaced by inequality. The two most prominent
models are those by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
While in the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model agents compare their own payoff to
the average payoff of all other agents, in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the relative income
comparison is a weighted sum of comparisons between each agent separately. Note that
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with only two agents those two models coincide. Although both models are close to one
another in spirit, somehow the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model has proved to be a bit
more flexible and most of the models discussed in this survey use it, or a variant of it, as
a reference point. A more detailed exposition of this model thus seems appropriate.
Fehr and Schmidt assume a utility function of the following form
Ui(xi) = xi − αi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{xj − xi, 0} − βi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{xi − xj, 0}.
I.e., utility is additively separable in income and disutility from inequitable outcomes.
The first addend xi is standard and depicts utility from monetary payoff. The second
addend, αi
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i max{xj − xi, 0}, creates disutility whenever the agent’s payoff falls
short of another player’s payoff whilst the third addend, βi
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i max{xi − xj, 0},
reduces utility when the reverse holds true, i.e. when the agent is better off than an
opponent.
The parameters αi and βi denote the weight that the agent puts on those social compar-
isons. The following restrictions are placed on these parameters: αi ≥ βi and βi ∈ [0, 1[.
This implies that agents suffer more from being worse off than others than from being
better off. And the assumption that βi ∈ [0, 1[ rules out both “status seeking” and
situations where agents would forego own material payoff in order to reduce favorable
inequity.
This functional form depicts “self centered inequity-aversion“, that is, agents are not
really interested in the allocation of wealth in the population, they are only interested
in their relative standing in this wealth distribution. Although the aversion towards
disadvantageous inequity is more pronounced than aversion towards advantageous distri-
butions, Fehr and Schmidt need both parts of the inequity aversion to explain observed
behavior. Moreover, they allow for heterogeneity in the population and inequity aversion
still has relevance even if a substantial part of the population is purely self-interested.
While intention based models clearly provide a more realistic depiction of reality, they
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are highly complicated to deal with3. Even very simple and abstract experimental games
are hard to solve and the more interesting problems basically become intractable. Thus
the purely outcome based models serve as short cuts for modelling reciprocal preferences.
While they are still analytically tractable they capture many aspects of reality and do a
remarkably good job in explaining experimental evidence.
3.3 The Moral Hazard Problem
As already highlighted in the introduction, the moral hazard problem is one of the central
problems of labor market analysis. Englmaier and Wambach (2002) were the first to intro-
duce inequity aversion into agency theory and by amending Holmstro¨m’s (1979) seminal
paper. In this model one principal and one agent interact. The agent’s (unobservable)
choice of effort influences the distribution of profits. Englmaier and Wambach make one
important change in Holmstro¨m’s model: the agent’s preferences exhibit inequity aversion
as he compares himself to the principal. As we will contrast the literature to this paper
more emphasis will be placed on its exposition in what follows.
The agent’s utility is given by
UA = u[w(x)]− c(e)− αG{[x− w(x)]− w(x)}
Utility consists of three parts. u[w(x)], the utility derived from monetary income, and c(e),
the disutility from effort, are standard. For those two parts the standard assumptions
apply, i.e. utility is increasing in income – however agents may be risk averse or risk
neutral – and effort costs increase in effort. New is the last part, αG{[x−w(x)]−w(x)}.
This captures the disutility from inequitable outcomes where α is the weight the agent
puts on achieving equitable outcomes.
The convex cost function G(·) displays the disutility from inequity. It is assumed to
be equal to zero at x− w(x) = w(x), i.e. for equitable outcomes where the agent’s wage
payment w(x) equals the principal’s net profit [x − w(x)], and also to be flat at this
3However see the recent paper by Cox and Friedman (2003) who try to build a “tractable model of
reciprocity”.
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point. But marginal disutility increases the further away from equity the outcome is. A
quadratic function would do that job. However, G(·) is not required to be symmetric
around zero. I.e. agents may – quite realistically – suffer a lot more from being worse off
than from being better off than the principal. The convexity implies an aversion against
lotteries over different levels of inequity.
It is assumed that the principal is of a standard type, that is, he is just interested in his
expected payoff and not in relative comparisons. Again, all the results would go through
qualitatively but the exposition would be more cumbersome.
Thus the principal’s problem takes the following form
max
w(x)
EUP =
x¯∫
x
f(x | e)[x− w(x)]dx
(PC) EUA =
x¯∫
x
f(x | e){uA[w(x)]− αG[x− 2w(x)]}dx− c(e) ≥ U
(IC) e ∈ arg max
e
EUA =
x¯∫
x
f(x | e){uA[w(x)]− αG[(x− 2w(x)]}dx− c(e).
To solve this problem the authors rely on the First Order Approach and it is assumed
that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property holds, that is, a higher profit can serve as
a signal for a higher effort choice.
Now I will present the results of this model in some depth, offer a brief intuition for
each of them, and compare them at each step with the standard result. Where effort is
contractible and the agent is risk neutral, the optimal contract is uniquely determined
by w′ = 1/2, that is, the first derivative of the wage scheme specifies an equal sharing
rule. This is in contrast to the standard case where there is no clear-cut prediction for the
contract structure. The principal extracts the rent with a flat payment, as agents dislike
fluctuations over different levels of inequity.
If we keep effort contractible but add risk aversion to the agent’s preferences, the
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standard case prescribes a flat wage. With inequity aversion this no longer holds and
the contract can only be shown to be increasing, as it now has to balance off insurance
against fluctuations in income and fluctuations in inequity. One can show that the slope
of the incentive scheme, w′, is bound between 0 and 1/2.
Let us now turn to the case of interest, where effort is no longer contractible, that is the
moral hazard problem. Start with considering a risk neutral agent. Here w′ is between 1/2
and 1 to balance off the desire to insure against inequity and to provide strong incentives.
Then adding risk aversion to the moral hazard problem leaves us - as in the standard case
- with the statement that w′ is strictly increasing with profit.
The comparative statics of the latter most general case, add further insights. If α, that
is the agent’s concern for equity, increases, the optimal contract converges to w = (1/2)x,
that is to the equal split. In that sense, inequity aversion adds a tendency towards linear
contracts. Furthermore inequity aversion is used as an additional incentive instrument.
If profit x increases, the agent is not only rewarded with a higher wage payment, but also
with a lower level of inequity. Thus both ways of creating utility (or reducing disutility)
are used4.
The last set of results alludes to Holmstro¨m’s influential sufficient statistics result.
Holmstro¨m proved that optimal contracts have to be conditional on all available informa-
tive signals (with respect to effort choice) but not on noninformative ones. The authors
show that in their set-up contracts may be incomplete or overdetermined. In a situation
where there is a better measure of performance than profit, that is a sufficient statistic
for the effort choice, contracts should still be conditional on profit as the agent is inher-
ently interested in profit as far as its distribution is concerned. In this sense contracts
are overdetermined. If the concern for equity continues to increase this concern for the
distribution of the payoff becomes increasingly dominant. Thus the optimal contract puts
less and less weight on the sufficient statistic and in the limiting case, for extremely high
values of α, disregards it altogether and is thus optimally left incomplete.
4Mayer and Pfeiffer (2003) analyze a version of the Englmaier and Wambach model. They restrict
contracts to be linear, utility exhibits constant absolute risk aversion and the agent chooses the mean of
a normal distribution. They can solve this model and confirm the findings by Englmaier and Wambach
(2002).
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The authors relate their theoretical results to some stylized facts, such as sharecropping
contracts predominantly specifying an equal split between landlord and tenant5, the per-
sistence of interindustry wage differentials where more profitable firms pay higher wages
to workers of the same profession6, and the widespread use of stock option plans at all
levels of a firm’s hierarchy7. Englmaier and Wambach (2002) offer some additional results
on the multi-agent case. These will be covered in Section 5 of this chapter.
Itoh (forthcoming) analyzes a model where the agent is risk neutral but wealth con-
strained. Furthermore the effort choice of the agent is not continuous but binary. His
qualitative results on the structure of contracts are similar to those of Englmaier and
Wambach (2002) but in addition he can show that the principal’s profit generally de-
creases if the agent’s concern for equity increases. This result depends on the restriction
that the principal always earns more than the agent. Hence whether the principal prefers
to employ inequity averse or “standard“ agents depends on the possible profit level. If the
possible profit levels are rather high, such that the principal is better off than the agent,
the principal has to pay high wages to the agent in order to counterbalance inequity.
Dur and Glazer (2003) analyze a model where a worker envies his boss, thus neglecting
the “α-part“ of Fehr and Schmidt’s model. Although the workers’ effort choice is con-
tinuous there are only two possible realizations of firm profits. Thus a bonus contract is
optimal. Like Englmaier and Wambach, they find a violation of the sufficient statistics
result. They can also show that envy increases incentive intensity but decreases the prin-
cipal’s profits. They discuss several interesting applications. They suggest that envy (or
more accurately a lack of it) may be a reason for less pronounced incentives in governmen-
tal organizations. As there is no single rich principal (or several presumably rich stock
holders) toward whom the workers may feel envious, since basically the general public
owns the firm, the incentive intensifying effect, present in private firms, disappears. Con-
tinuing this argument they note that progressive taxation - reducing income disparities -
may in fact be efficiency enhancing, as it dampens the adverse effects of envy. Another
application they mention is in consumer goods markets. Consumers compare themselves
to the “rich“ producers of goods and are unwilling to leave too high profits to them. This
5Cf. e.g. Bardhan (1984) or Bardhan and Rudra (1980).
6Cf. e.g. Thaler (1989) in a meta study.
7Cf. e.g. Oyer and Schaefer (2003).
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affects their willingness to pay and thus restricts the producers’ pricing behavior.
3.4 Multiple Agents - Tournaments
If one now analyzes situations where there is more than one agent interacting with the
principal, tournaments seem to be a natural starting setting for exploring the effects of
social preferences. In a tournament, agents compete for a prize and only one of them can
win. This automatically generates inequality. Tournaments are a widely studied means
of providing incentives. Following the seminal contribution by Lazear and Rosen (1981),
much work has been devoted to exploring the incentive properties of tournaments and to
pin down situations where their use is actually optimal.
Although it is not really a tournament situation, Rey Biel’s (2002) model is a good
starting point to demonstrate the basic mechanism at work. He develops a deterministic
model where two agents simultaneously have to make a binary effort choice. This choice
is not plagued by moral hazard. The principal can contract the agent’s choice. Rey
Biel uses this simple framework to highlight how the principal can utilize the agents’
inequity aversion by offering them very unequal payoffs off the desired equilibrium and
thus reduce costs. The desired equilibrium is where both exert high effort. Offering
agents unequal payoffs if this outcome is not reached, inflicts disutility on them, thereby
making the desired outcome, where both get the same pay, relatively more attractive.
One could interpret this as a special kind of tournament where both get the prize if
performance exceeds a given threshold. In this framework Rey Biel find that the agents’
social preferences increase the principal’s profits. This comes as no surprise given that
the principal gets an additional instrument to generate incentives. However, the analysis
neglects the agents’ participation constraint, which the author justifies by arguing that
the agents would also face inequity in alternative occupations.
Turning to more standard tournament settings with stochastic production and just one
agent winning the prize, renders disregarding the participation constraint less innocuous
than one might think, because now the agent has to be compensated upfront for the
inequity inflicted on him in order to create incentives. Taking the participation constraint
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into account thus changes the picture quite dramatically.
Grund and Sliwka (2002) do so. They analyze a simple tournament where two agents
compete for a prize. The one with the higher output wins, where output is a function of
effort plus an error term. They call the part of Fehr and Schmidt’s model where agents
suffer from being worse off “envy“, and the part where agents suffer from being better off,
“compassion“. For a given prize structure they show that profits unambiguously increase
with an increase in the agents’ degree of envy and decrease with an increase in the agents’
degree of compassion. As agents expect to feel envy if their opponent wins the tournament
they have an incentive to work harder in order to avoid this. On the other hand, if they
are compassionate they are not so happy about winning. The latter effect dampens the
incentive to work hard.
However if the principal can also choose the prize structure and wants to do so optimally,
he has to obey the participation constraint. As in Englmaier and Wambach (2002), Grund
and Sliwka assume that the outside option is exogenously given. They find that inequity
aversion lowers the principal’s profits. The reason is that the agent has to be compensated
upfront for the inequity that is going to be inflicted on him for incentive reasons, and this
extra compensation outweighs the positive incentive effects. From that, Grund and Sliwka
draw conclusions for a firm’s optimal promotion policy. Interpreting a tournament as a
competition for promotion, they compare vertical and lateral promotions. Whereas in
vertical promotions the team leader is hired from within a team or group, in lateral
promotions a team leader is always hired from another team. Now assuming that within
a team social preferences are more pronounced, they conclude that lateral promotion
schemes are preferable.
Demougin and Fluet (2003) also analyze a two person tournament but they differ in
three respects from Grund and Sliwka. First, they consider the limited liability case. Thus
there can even be ex-ante rents for the agent. Second, agents do not compare their gross
payments but their rents, that is their received payments net of effort costs. And third,
the principal can invest resources in order to make the tournament more informative.
If in the initial situation the participation constraint does not bind, envy lowers the
principal’s wage costs and thus increases profits. If, however, agents do not earn rents,
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envy and compassion both reduce profits. While the latter result is in line with Grund
and Sliwka (2002) the first case is different. In the standard case, when providing only
monetary incentives, the principal leaves some rent to the agent due to limited liability.
The incentives provided via the threat of inequitable outcomes are not subject to the
wealth constraint and thus, for a given wealth constraint the incentive intensity is stronger.
Taking into account the principal’s ability to increase the tournament’s informational
content and to focus on the envy part of inequity aversion, provides additional insights.
If additional precision is “cheap“ to attain, envy in fact increases profits. If however
additional precision is “expensive“, profits fall.
3.5 Multiple Agents - Teams
Examining more general mechanisms than tournaments, while taking care of social pref-
erences, the analysis of team problems becomes a more elaborate task. A first guess
might be that the effect is similar to that described by Rasmusen (1987) for risk aversion.
We can improve upon the initial situation by offering random contracts off the desired
equilibrium outcome level. These random contracts have to assign the whole outcome to
one player. As a consequence agents not only face the risk of getting nothing when they
shirk, but they are also likely to suffer from a large degree of inequality. Hence, as with
risk aversion, this constitutes a form of commitment to “burn money” off the equilibrium,
thus rendering a deviation less alluring. In a sense the effect is similar to the introduction
of a budget breaking principal who will happily keep the money if the agents have fallen
short of the equilibrium effort.
But social preferences do more than just reinforce the effects of risk aversion. Englmaier
and Wambach (2004) extend their model discussed in section three for the case of many
inequity averse agents. They find that whenever an output measure is available for each
agent, the optimal contract has to be conditional on each agent’s individual output mea-
sure, even if the tasks are technologically independent. The reason is that by doing so
the agents are offered insurance against inequitable payoffs. In the limiting case where
the agents’ concern for fairness is the only important driving force, the optimal contract
has a very simple structure as it is only conditional on overall output. In this way, they
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deliver a simple rationale for the widespread use of team based incentives.
While in standard team production problems the rationale for using team based in-
centives (or relative performance evaluation schemes) is that this will filter out common
shocks from the performance measures, Englmaier and Wambach’s result is driven by the
fact that agents have an inherent interest in the other agents’ outcome. Here team based
incentives are used as an insurance mechanism against very unequal outcomes.
Itoh (forthcoming) gets results similar to those of Englmaier and Wambach (2002)
but since his model is less general, he manages to pin down the contract structure a
bit more. In Itoh’s model the two risk neutral agents have a binary effort choice and
the limited liability constraint holds. Where agents perform technologically independent
projects, he basically finds two possible contracts: an extreme team contract where all
agents always get the same payment and an extreme relative performance contract which
is similar to a tournament. The extreme team contract is optimal if either agents are
highly inequity averse or the project is very risky. Note that in this case the principal’s
payoff is independent of the degree of inequity aversion, as agents are always paid the
same. In the opposite case the extreme relative performance contract is optimal. Here
the principal generates inequity and makes use of it.
Allowing for correlated shocks to the two projects, standard theory would call for the
relative performance contract. But due to a sufficient amount of inequity aversion, the
extreme team contract may remain optimal in this case. In another specification analyzed
by Itoh, agents do not compare their gross payments but their rents, net of effort costs.
Under this assumption, he can show that the team contract is more likely to be optimal,
meaning that it is optimal for a larger set of parameter constellations.
Bartling and von Siemens (2004a) analyze a situation with deterministic team produc-
tion. They require contracts to be budget balancing and renegotiation proof. Starting
from that they construct an equilibrium where the optimal contract is “equal at the top“,
that is it gives an equal share to every worker if all (or all but one) agents choose high
effort and assign the whole output (deterministically) to just one agent otherwise. With
this mechanism they find that inequity aversion is beneficial. However, this positive effect
decreases with team size. They interpret this to be the reason why small work teams
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seem to perform better than larger ones. They then distinguish between worker owned
firms, that is, firms with no principal claiming residual output for himself, and firms with
a principal. They find that worker owned firms may be inefficiently small, as agents may
not want to employ an additional worker even if it were efficient to do so. They anticipate
that overall surplus will be shared evenly and they may be better off with their share in
the smaller firm than in the (more efficient) larger firm. This effect is absent if there is a
principal running the firm.
In a companion paper Bartling and von Siemens (2004b) analyze a team production
setting with stochastic production for a restricted class of utility functions. There are two
agents who have to make a binary effort choice. The agents’ projects are technologically
independent. Here agents are not inequity averse but only suffer from envy. Assuming
inequity aversion instead may, however, invert their results. They show that envy un-
ambiguously increases agency costs. In order to insure against the risk of suffering from
envy, the principal has to give equitable flat wage contracts instead of incentive contracts
and, as in Englmaier and Wambach (2002), team based contracts may become optimal.
In order to avoid these effects of envy, the principal may prefer to employ only one agent
although it would be efficient to employ the other too. The authors also ask whether
salaries should be kept secret. Interestingly they find that keeping salaries secret is a bad
idea as it takes away the chance to insure against relative income fluctuations by making
one worker’s pay conditional on the other workers’ pay.
Masclet (2002) extends the standard team production game with an additional stage
where inequity averse agents can punish their shirking colleagues. They will do so in
order to re-establish equity. As in public goods games, described, for instance, by Fehr
and Ga¨chter (2000), the efficient cooperative outcome now becomes implementable. This
is very close in spirit to Kandel and Lazear’s (1992) model of peer pressure.
Huck and Rey Biel (2003), too, extend the standard team production framework. They
analyze a two player situation with an exogenously given equal sharing rule. Both agents
are again inequity averse. But here they explore what happens if agents can choose their
effort sequentially. In their example they show that moving sequentially (with the less
productive agent starting) can improve the situation because the agent that moves first
can push the one that follows to a higher level of effort by choosing higher effort himself.
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The agent who moves later does not want to fall short of the first one’s contribution.
Their result is driven by their assumption that agents do not compare gross payments
but payments net of effort costs.
There are two more models that provide interesting insights on the interaction of in-
centives and social preferences. Although they are not based on inequity aversion I want
to discuss them here.
In Rob and Zemsky’s (2002) dynamic model, people are not inequity averse but they
can build up social capital. Agents can decide whether to help each other or to produce
on their own. Helping is efficient but not contractible. In the repeated game, agents are
more willing to help if they have received help from the other agent before, that is, if social
capital has been built up. A contractible performance measure is also available. Putting
more weight on this contractible performance measure reduces the incentive to help, as
producing more output oneself becomes relatively more lucrative. Choosing different
dynamic incentive structures can give rise to “cultural“ differences across firms.
In Huck, Ku¨bler, and Weibull (2003) agents are concerned about adherence to a so-
cial norm which emerges endogenously. They restrict themselves to linear contracts and
analyze the effects of such social norms in two settings. When only overall team output
is observable, the social norm fosters positive externalities. If the others work more, an
agent is also expected to work more in order to adhere to the social norm. This increases
team output and everybody’s pay. In this situation multiple equilibria exist. The au-
thors ask whether dynamically adjusting the slope of the incentive scheme can help the
principal to select the most profitable equilibrium. If individual output is observable,
relative performance schemes are utilized. If an agent now exerts more effort this has a
negative effect on the relative performance of the other agents. There are now negative
externalities and the norm may compress effort. The overall effect of social norms is thus
unclear.
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3.6 Conclusion
This survey has shown how incorporating social preferences in economic models can en-
hance our understanding of relationships in the work place. Social preferences interact in
non-trivial ways with incentives and alter the structure of optimal compensation schemes,
sometimes drastically. But the research on these issues is still in its infancy.
So far the results are inconclusive with respect to the question: under what circum-
stances is a fair-minded workforce desirable? Related issues are the implications of social
preferences for structuring work teams, the production process, the informational envi-
ronment or even the boundaries of the firm. These topics deserve further investigation.
Yet another interesting question is the interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic moti-
vation and whether the provision of high powered monetary incentives might crowd out
intrinsic motivation. One could guess that these high powered incentives change the na-
ture of interaction and thus affect the way social preferences come into play. For further
discussion of these topics see, for example, Fehr and Rockenbach (2002) or Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000).
As already alluded to by Rotemberg (1994) the commitment power provided by social
preferences for principals or team leaders needs investigation. Research along these lines
may shed light on the determinants of good leadership and trust.
Finally it should by now be clear that the definition of the reference group (peer group)
and the definition of what actually is the job and the surplus generated from it is very
important for the analysis. Those concepts, familiar to researchers in human resources,
have so far received insufficient attention from economic theorists.
In conclusion, incorporating social preferences into models of agency can open the door
to a fruitful dialogue between economic theorists and human resource researchers, and
can prove to be a promising new avenue for research.
Chapter 4
A brief Survey on Strategic
Delegation
4.1 Introduction
Delegation means that an agent is entitled by a principal to carry out an action on his own
responsibility. In standard models of the firm, e.g. Demsetz (1983) or Fama and Jensen
(1983), this delegation is somewhat technology driven as the agent is indispensable for
carrying out a specific task since only he has the required ability or human capital. In
models of asymmetric information, Moral Hazard or Adverse Selection, this very need to
delegate an action and the resulting conflict of interest between principal and agent is a
problem that one tries to solve by aligning preferences as well as possible.
However, there are more elaborate interpretations of delegation that make use of the
difference in interests between agent and principal. Now defining delegation as giving up
control over certain decisions allows richer interpretations in various environments.
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4.2 Intra Firm Effects of Delegation
Let us start looking at delegation within the boundaries of a firm. Philippe Aghion has a
series of papers with various co–authors on the issue of the principal giving up control for
a purpose. In Aghion and Bolton (1992) it is argued that allocating control contingent
on the realized state of the world, i.e. firm profit, can help explain the financial structure
of a firm, as delegating control to the financier in bad states of the world mitigates the
conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the financier.
Aghion and Tirole (1997) take a different focus and look on real versus formal authority.
In this model the principal gives up his formal authority and delegates real authority, i.e.
the right to decide upon project implementation, to the agent who has to come up with the
project himself. Knowing that he will have some discretion in implementing a project of
his choice raises the agents incentives to exert effort to come up with a project in the first
place. However there is an issue of how the principal can credibly commit not to overrule
the agent’s project choice (as he is still endowed with the formal authority to do so) when
the agent’s project is too much biased to cater to the agent’s interests. They suggest
“strategic overload” as a solution for this commitment problem. The principal takes
over a span of control which is so wide that he cannot effectively gather the information
necessary to overrule the agent’s decision. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) on the
other hand solve the commitment problem in a repeated interaction model where the
principal builds up a reputation for not interfering.
Finally, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (2004) study transferable control. They argue
that the transfer of control rights can be used to extract information about the type of
the agent to whom control is transferred. If the principal gives him discretion a bad type
will abuse this power and reveal himself as a bad type whereas a good type will prove
trustworthy. Thus, delegating control early on in a worker’s career helps screening types.
Related to the analysis in Aghion and Tirole (1997) on how to provide agents with
appropriate incentives to generate ideas is Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) who study the
potential use of visionary managers. They define such visionaries as being systematically
biased towards projects from a certain field or product group. This increases their sub-
ordinates’ incentives to come up with such projects as they can be more confident that
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those projects will be adopted.
4.3 Inter Firm Effects of Delegation
All the above papers aim at explaining the effects of delegation within a firm. However
most firms are interacting on (imperfectly) competitive markets with other firms and
thus it is interesting to look at the interaction between the form of delegation and the
competition on the market. While Schmidt (1997) addresses the question how product
market competition affects the optimal shape of managerial incentives we are here more
interested in the reverse effect: How does the choice of managerial incentives affect the
competition on the product market.
Already Schelling (1960, p. 142/3) noted: “The use of thugs and sadists for the collec-
tion of extortion or the guarding of prisoners, or the conspicuous delegation of authority
to a military commander of known motivation, exemplifies a common means of mak-
ing credible a response pattern that the original source of the decision might have been
thought to shrink from or to find profitless, once the threat had failed.”
What he describes here is that by delegating certain tasks to agents with preferences
different from one’s own, one can make threats credible that were not individually rational
to carry out if oneself would act. Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd
(1987) and Sklivas (1987) incorporated this into an industrial organization framework
where the firm owners can alter the manager’s preferences by changing his incentive
scheme.
Vickers (1985) analyzes a situation where two firms are engaged in Cournot competition
and the firm owners can simultaneously decide upon the incentive contracts for their
managers who have to decide upon the quantities offered by the firms. He can show that
these contracts have elements of relative performance evaluation in them, thus inducing
the agent to act more aggressively. Vickers (1985) highlights the implications of his
findings for the theory of the firm and interprets the commonly observed separation of
ownership and control and the prevalence of multi–division firms or the degree of vertical
integration from a strategic delegation perspective.
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The point that relative performance evaluation has not only informative aspects but
also influences the way managers interact in product market competition was further
elaborated by Fumas (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). The latter paper tests
empirically the prediction that relative performance elements make managers more ag-
gressive and finds their prediction confirmed. In highly competitive industries – where
committing to even more aggressive behavior would be harmful – they do not find rel-
ative performance elements in executive contracts whilst in industries with low levels of
competition they are prevalent.
Another way to make managers more aggressive is conditioning their pay not only on
own profits but also on sales. Fershtman (1985) provides an example that in Cournot
duopoly firm profits increase if managerial incentive contracts condition not only on prof-
its but also sales. Fershtman and Judd (1987) extend this analysis to differentiated
Bertrand competition and show that the owners there also have an incentive to distort
managerial incentives. But whilst under Cournot competition the optimal contract entails
a positive premium on sales under differentiated Bertrand competition this premium on
sales is negative. Along the same lines is the analysis by Sklivas (1987) who focuses on
the separation of ownership and control and analyzes the desirability of delegation for
firm owners. He shows that delegation is always a dominant strategy. But whilst under
Bertrand competition profits go up when firms are able to delegate decisions to an appro-
priately incentivized manager in Cournot competition this ability to delegate strengthens
competition and lowers firm profits1.
1Huck, Mu¨ller and Normann (2004) experimentally test the predictions of Fershtman (1985), Sklivas
(1987) and Vickers (1985) that firm owners give contracts on profit and sales to manager. In their
experiment the owners can choose to give a contract on profits only or one that puts some weight on sales
also. They find that contrary to the theoretical prediction the latter is not chosen. But their analysis
shows also that this is rational given the fact that managers in the final stage do not play the standard
subgame perfect equilibrium but act such that their behavior is best described by social preferences a la
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Whether this is a remedy of their experimental setting is at least debatable.
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4.4 The Role of Observability
All the above papers start from the assumption that delegation is observable. And it is
this very observability that makes delegation valuable as it allows to commit to aggressive
behavior.
Now there are two possible issues with that. On the one hand it may be possible to
write secret sidecontracts countervailing the initial delegation contract, i.e. the actual
contract structure may not be credibly signalled to the market, on the other hand there
may be renegotiation of the initial contract.
Katz (1991) focusses on the analysis of delegation with unobservable contracts but he
does not allow for renegotiation of the initial contract. In his setting the principal cannot
decide whether to hire an agent or not but can only decide upon the manager’s incentive
scheme. He finds that the set of Nash equilibria under delegation coincides with the
set of Nash equilibria when the principal acts himself whenever the first best allocation
is implementable. I.e. in a moral hazard problem with a risk neutral manager, where
the optimal contract makes the manager residual claimant, delegation has no bite, as
the principal cannot make credible to the market any other contract than the first best
contract. Thus there is no added commitment power. When the first best allocation
cannot be implemented by the agency contract then delegation has an effect. This is not
surprising as, e.g. due to matters of risk sharing, the agent optimally acts differently from
the principal.
Fershtman and Kalai (1997) elaborate on Katz (1991) and analyze the effects of dele-
gation if there is restricted observability. Delegation still has an effect when in a repeated
setting information can be transmitted to the market (if there is learning about delegation)
or when with some probability the delegation contract is observed.
Kockesen and Ok (2004) pursue another avenue. They also assume that contracts are
unobservable and that there is no renegotiation. In their basic setting they look at one
sided delegation but the principal can choose whether to hire an agent or not. To hire
an agent is costly and can be observed by the market. By using forward induction they
construct “well–supported” equilibria with delegation. The intuition for their argument
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is that the principal would not spend money on hiring an agent if it were not for reasons
of strategic delegation. They extend their model along two dimensions. First they look at
two–sided delegation and find that in any pure strategy equilibrium at least one principal
chooses to delegate. Furthermore they allow for renegotiation of the initial contract. If
this renegotiation is costless it undoes the effect of strategic delegation: hence there will
be only delegation in equilibrium if renegotiation is limited or costly.
Beaudry and Poitevin (1994) focus solely on the renegotiation issue. In their paper
the principals simultaneously write delegation contracts with their managers and then
simultaneously renegotiate these contracts. They analyze costless renegotiation in two
settings. In the first setting renegotiation takes place before the actual actions or decisions
for which the agent is hired are taken. In this situation renegotiation has no effect as the
situation has not changed as compared to the initial contract. Thus delegation works
here. In their second setting the renegotiation takes place while the decisions or actions
are taken. Under this setting the ex post distortions are greatly reduced and can no longer
be used for commitment purposes. The principal has an incentive to renegotiate to the
efficient contract, which is anticipated and thus commitment via delegation loses its bite
in the first place.
Summing up, one has to note that limited observability or similarly the possibility
to renegotiate the initial contract can undo much of the effects of strategic delegation.
However, there are quite strict disclosure requirements for managerial contracts in the US
such that the observability of these contracts should be reasonably ensured, thus making
strategic delegation an available option in a firm’s policy space.
4.5 Strategic Elements of Financial Structure
So far the focus was on contracts as a means of strategically manipulating an agent’s
preferences. But already early on in the discussion of the possible role of strategic dele-
gation the importance of a firm’s financial structure for its management’s incentives has
been noted. In Brander and Lewis (1986) the firm owners can choose to issue debt. This
debt introduces a probability that the firm goes bankrupt. In their model the preferences
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of the (risk neutral) manager and the owners are perfectly aligned. Thus the manager
maximizes a convex objective function. Firms are engaged in Cournot competition and
the possibility of bankruptcy (due to the issued debt) shifts the reaction functions out-
wards which leads to tougher competition. In Brander and Lewis (1986) the equilibrium
is characterized by positive debt levels, higher quantities and lower profits. Thus firms
are in some sense locked in a prisoner’s dilemma. Though issuing debt makes them worse
off in equilibrium it is unilaterally a dominant strategy. However their findings are not
empirically backed2 as higher debt levels tend to be associated with higher profits.
There are two papers that bring in line the basic idea by Brander and Lewis (1986)
with the stylized facts. Showalter (1995) does so by assuming differentiated Bertrand
competition and Nier (1998) gets it right by assuming that the manager is just interested
in avoiding bankruptcy, i.e. he is extremely risk averse. In both papers the key effect is
that managers’ actions are no longer strategic substitutes but complements.
4.6 Strategic Delegation in Political Economy
The last section already dealt with a general framework and not an individual contract
that is used to alter an agent’s behavior. However we still needed contract enforceability
to use these arrangements on the financial structure to generate incentives. But there are
many situations where no binding contracts can be written. A prime example for such
a situation can be found in Political Economy where the idea of strategically delegating
power to an agent was exploited, too. The first and probably still most prominent example
is Rogoff’s (1985) model of central bank policy. The government wants to promise low
inflation and afterwards stimulate the economy by surprise inflation. Rogoff now argues
that delegating monetary policy authority to an independent conservative central banker
can mitigate this time inconsistency problem. Walsh (1995) uses the same ideas and
derives the optimal contract for a central banker. This contract makes pay contingent on
observable performance indicators of the economy and distorts incentives in the direction
of a conservative central banker. He analyzes the problem for a banker with the same
preferences as the government and with an opportunistic banker who is only interested in
2Cf. e.g. Chevalier (1995).
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monetary payments.
Another example of strategic delegation in Political Economy is Persson and Tabellini
(1994) who deal with the problem of capital taxation with imperfectly mobile capital. Ex–
ante the state wants to promise low taxes to attract capital, but once investments have
been made the state wants to impose a high tax. The electorate now can partially commit
to a low tax policy by electing a “rich” politician who has less interest in redistributive
politics.
4.7 Conclusion
While in most models of strategic delegation in and between firms the delegation effect is
created by a contractual structure (incentive contracts or financial contracts) the Political
Economy applications resorted to personal traits of agents. There has been only little work
done in this direction in IO or agency theory. The next two papers of this dissertation
will focus on the role of preference characteristics (A Model of Delegation in Contests) or
more specifically of bounded rationality (A Strategic Rationale for having Overconfident
Managers) for issues of strategic delegation. This was also pointed at by Schelling (1960,
pp. 142/3) whose above quote continued: “Just as it would be rational for a rational
player to destroy his own rationality in certain game situations, either to deter a threat
that might be made against him or to make credible a threat that he could not otherwise
commit himself to, it may also be rational for a player to select irrational partners or
agents.”
Chapter 5
A Model of Delegation in
Contests
5.1 Introduction
In the last twenty years contests received a lot of publicity not only in the economics
literature, but also in political science and other related fields. Especially in the form
of rent seeking contests they were extensively analyzed. Starting with Tullock’s seminal
paper (Tullock, 1980) a large strand of literature evolved1.
Contests have been used to model a wide array of situations of conflicts, ranging from
inter-state conflicts (see e.g. Hirshleifer (2001)) to promotion tournaments (see e.g. Lazear
and Rosen (1981)). A common feature of these models is that no explicit contract can
be written to allocate a disputed rent and that the resources spent in the contest are
regarded as sunk.
In this paper we recognize that contests often take place between different groups. In
the light of this we explicitly allow for the possibility that the members of these respective
groups might have differing valuations for the contested rent. This seems quite natural: If
1See Nitzan(1994) for a detailed review of the rent seeking literature.
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a group of producers tries to influence lawmakers to create favorable legislation2, the value
of this legislation is likely to be different for different group members. As an example one
might consider the market for agricultural products where the value of specific legislation
may vary greatly between large industrial farmers and smaller family run farms.
If we allow for this intra-group heterogeneity, there is a conflict of interest between
different members of the group on how much resources to spend in the contest. The
problem becomes even more severe if one takes into account the fact that typically not all
the group members are actively participating in the contest, but typically groups assign
delegates that act in the contest on behalf of the whole group.
This naturally gives rise to a delegation problem as we assume that the assigned rep-
resentative will act according to her preferences once she is in office3. In our model the
Median Voter Theorem can be applied, thus the delegate’s assignment can be modelled
as the median voter’s choice problem over different delegates’ types.
Our model allows us to analyze under what circumstances radical appointees come
into power. The model predicts that in most situations of conflict “tough” types will
negotiate with “weak” types and that it is rather unlikely that two opponents with the
same degree of “radicalization” meet. Furthermore we can show that delegated rent
seeking is generically less wasteful than conventional rent-seeking. Thus delegation is a
desirable feature from a social planner’s point of view.
The delegation problem has also a long tradition in the political economy literature.
Agents often want to delegate certain actions to other agents that have preferences dif-
ferent to their own as the latter might be able to commit more credibly to carry out
certain actions at a future point in time. A prominent example is Rogoff‘s (1985) model
of monetary policy. In his model a central banker faces a time inconsistency problem as
his incentives are altered once the private sector has formed its expectations over future
inflation. It turns out that the optimal solution is to delegate the monetary authority
to a conservative and independent central banker who will never use monetary policy
as a macroeconomic stimulus. Similar incentives work in capital taxation. Persson and
2Cf. the work of Pelzman (1976).
3This gives our analysis the flavor of citizen candidate models a la Besley and Coate (1997) or Osborne
and Slivinsky (1996).
5.1. INTRODUCTION 67
Tabellini (1994) analyze a model where, before capital is accumulated, politicians have an
incentive to promise low tax rates. Once the capital is accumulated politicians have clear
incentives to tax the capital contrary to their past promises. Political economy equilib-
rium models show that median voters find it optimal to delegate the taxation authority to
a politician who possesses more wealth than they do as the wealthier person can commit
more credibly not to overtax the capital4. Whilst in these two examples delegation is
used to overcome a time inconsistency problem our model focuses on the strategic value
of delegation in situations of conflict.
Also in the context of contests strategic delegation has been analyzed. Dixit (1987)
shows that agents have a local incentive to commit to exert higher effort in a contest.
However he remains silent about how this commitment can work and points out that the
specific channels of commitment should be analyzed in depth. We present one possible
way to do this and offer a full analysis.
Baik and Shogren (1992) build on Dixit (1987) and endogenize the order of moves.
They can show that the “underdog” always wants to move first whilst the “leader” is
happy to wait for his time to come. However we come to a different conclusion: In our
framework both types would want to be the first mover.
Allard (1988) and Leininger (1993) analyze asymmetric contests but do not allow for
delegation. In addition they focus only on the effect of asymmetry on the rent dissipation
in these contests.
Levy and Razin (2002) analyze a model of two conflicting states where the electorate’s
choice to either delegate or retain final decision rights leads to improved information
transmission about a “country’s preferences”. Whilst they use this “indirect” effect of
delegation to overcome problems of informational asymmetry our model is one of sym-
metric information and we focus on the more direct effects of delegation.
There is also a relation to the auction and the bargaining literature. Contests are
closely related to all–pay–auctions5. But whilst all pay auctions are a special case of fully
4See Person and Tabellini (2000) for a comprehensive treatment of this literature.
5Baye et al. (1993) and Hilman and Riley (1989) are examples of applying all–pay–auctions to lobby-
ing.
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discriminating contests (i.e. the contestant spending the most certainly wins), we look
at not-fully discriminating contests, i.e. the party spending more is not with certainty
the winner. There is a small literature on delegation in bargaining that tries to analyze
under which circumstances it might be optimal to let the bargaining be carried out by
somebody that has costs to revise an initial proposal. Whereas these models assume
exogenously given, vaguely defined costs of revising former positions, our model derives
the aggressiveness of different negotiators endogenously from their valuations of the rent.
Finally, our paper relates to the game theoretic analysis of arms races. If one is willing
to interpret the groups as nations, the resources as military expenditure and the rent as
something that can be gained in foreign policy, our model can be seen as a model of arms
races. We allow for this interpretation as we believe the model can explain in a simple
way several features of arms races.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section two introduces the basics
of the model. We then derive personal preferences over delegate’s types and show that the
median voter theorem can be applied. In section four we look at a simple version of the
model where only one group has to appoint a member that carries out the rent–seeking
activities. This simplified version already gives us valuable insights into the mechanisms
at work. In section five, we look at sequential delegation decisions, in section six the
same is done for simultaneous delegation decisions. Section seven provides some possible
extensions. Finally, we conclude in section eight.
5.2 Basic Model
To fix ideas consider two countries a and b that quarrel about a foreign policy issue6.
Assume this issue can be captured by a rent R. These countries each have to appoint
first a politician to act on their behalf. These politicians then have to decide how much
of a given budget Ba to spend in the contest
7. We solve for a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium by first solving the final stage contest game taking the acting politician’s
6See Paul and Wilwhite (1990) for a similar interpretation.
7For simplicity we will, without loss of generality, set out the primitives of the model from the per-
spective of country a.
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types as given. Then we use these results when deriving the optimal delegation decision
of a country. There is no asymmetric information in the model.
The citizens of the two states may have differing valuations of this rent. The valuation
of the rent to citizen i is αiaR, i.e. α
i
a can be seen as the weight placed on the foreign
policy issue. αi is continuously distributed according to the distribution function fa(α)
within each group. The only restriction we put on the distribution functions is that they
have to be bounded on (0, αa] , i.e. there exists a most radical type αa .
An integral part of the model is the contest success function (CSF) g(ma; mb) that
determines the probability of winning the contest for a contestant dependent on the
resources spent by him, ma , and the opponent, mb . To avoid technical difficulties
assume g(0; 0) = 1/2.
To model the contest we use a Tullock style contest success function ma
ma+mb
. Our results
would hold for all “constant returns to scale” contest success functions, i.e. functions of the
form θma
θma+pimb
that are homogenous of degree 0. See the Appendix 10.1 for an exposition
with a general constant returns to scale contest success function.
Skaperdas (1996) shows at least that the general structure ha(ma)∑
hj(mj))
, with hj(mj)
being an increasing function, is the only structure that fulfills several desirable axioms:
the contest success function satisfies the conditions on a probability distribution, the
success probability is increasing in the own expenses, an anonymity property applies and
independence of irrelevant actions, i.e. actions of non-participants, holds8.
To ease the exposition we focus on Tullock’s initially proposed function ma
ma+mb
. As
we stick to risk neutrality throughout one can interpret this not only as the winning
probability but also as being the share the group secures for itself.
An individual citizen i’s utility function in country a is given by
ui = αiaR
ma
ma + mb
+ (Ba −ma)
8For contest success functions of the more general form
mk
a
mk
a
+mk
b
we have the problem that we do not
get closed form solutions for k 6= 1. However numerical examples give us some hope that our main results
should remain qualitatively unchanged with increasing returns to scale (k > 1) or decreasing returns to
scale (k < 1) contest success functions.
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This states that utility is increasing in the (expected) rent and decreasing in the re-
sources spent by the country in the contest. This cost −ma can be considered as the
foregone public good which is produced with a simple linear production function from the
exogenously given budget Ba not spent in the contest
9.
In our extensions section later on we will introduce heterogeneity in the cost of provision
of the public good and analyze the effects.
We proceed from here by first deriving the equilibrium of the contest stage dependent
on the politician’s types. Then we use our results to derive in the next section the citizens’
preferences over politician’s types.
In the contest stage the two agents i (for county a) and j (for county b) in charge
maximize their utility by deciding upon ma and mb.
max
ma
ui = αiaR
ma
ma + mb
+ (Ba −ma)
max
mb
uj = αjbR
mb
ma + mb
+ (Bb −mb)
From the two first order conditions of this problem we can solve for the reaction func-
tions
ma =
√
mbRαia −mb and mb =
√
maRα
j
b −ma
and the equilibrium values of m∗a and m
∗
b which are uniquely determined by
m∗a = R
(αia)
2
αjb(
αia + α
j
b
)2 and m∗b = R αia
(
αjb
)2(
αia + α
j
b
)2 .
They depend only on the politicians’ types and on the size of the rent under consider-
ation10.
It is interesting and facilitates the intuition of our results later on to note already here
how these equilibrium values for m∗a and m
∗
b behave in the limits with respect to the acting
9Alternatively think of the contest expenditure financed by an equal per-capita-tax. However our
model works as long as the share in financing can not be made dependent on the valuation.
10Note that for αia = α
j
b = 1 , i.e. the situation analyzed by Tullock (1980) the values not surprisingly
boil down to his solution, namely m∗a=m
∗
b =
R
4 .
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politicians’ types. Interestingly the equilibrium contests spending does not go to infinity
if the politician’s valuation of the rent goes to infinity, but is bounded.
Lemma 1 If the politician’s valuation of the rent goes to infinity the equilibrium contest
spending stays bounded with
lim
αia→∞
m∗a = Rα
j
b and lim
αi
b
→∞
m∗b = Rα
i
a.
5.3 Individual Preferences over Types
This section uses our results from above on the contest stage game to derive individual
citizens’ preferences over politicians’ types. From above we know the equilibrium values
of m∗a and m
∗
b are uniquely determined by
m∗a = R
(αia)
2
αjb(
αia + α
j
b
)2 and m∗b = R αia
(
αjb
)2(
αia + α
j
b
)2 .
Now we are interested in the question what kind of politician a citizen i would like to
send into the contest, taking country b’s politician choice as given. Would he want to act
himself or would he want to have a politician with a lower or higher valuation αPa than
his own to act on his behalf?
Thus the problem of state a citizen i is given by
max
αPa
ui = αiaR
ma
(
αPa , α
P
b
)
ma (αPa , α
P
b ) + mb (α
P
a , α
P
b )
−ma
(
αPa , α
P
b
)
.
Using our results from above the problem becomes
max
αPa
αiaR
(
αPa
)2
αPb
(αPa )
2 αPb + α
P
a (α
P
b )
2 −R
(
αPa
)2
αPb
(αPa + α
P
b )
2
and we can solve for the reaction function
αP
∗
a =
αPb α
i
a
2αPb − αia
.
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Figure 5.1: Reaction Function
Looking at the comparative statics we find that the optimal action increases in the
citizen’s type ∂α
P∗
a
∂αia
= 2
(
αP
b
2αP
b
−αia
)2
> 0 and decreases in the type of the other country’s
politician, ∂α
P∗
a
∂αP
b
= −
(
αia
2αP
b
−αia
)2
< 0 .
Note that in the case where country b’s politician has exactly the same valuation as
the country a citizen under consideration, α
P
b = α
i
a, this country a citizen prefers to act
himself, αP
∗
a = α
i
a.
If we now draw the reaction function (see Figure 5.1) we have to be careful. Due to
some properties of the contest success function the country a citizen would like to delegate
to a politician with a negative valuation for cases where he is confronted with a country
b politician with a very low valuation (α
P
b <
α
M
a αa
(2αa−αMa )
). As we restricted the type space
to positive valuation types we can show that in all those cases the utility of citizen i is
strictly increasing in αPa (see Appendix 10.2) and thus he wants to delegate to the most
radical type αa . This leads to the vertical piece in the reaction function. Thus the
reaction function is characterized by αP
∗
a =
αM
b
αMa
2αM
b
−αMa
if
αM
b
αMa
2αM
b
−αMa
< αa and by α
P ∗
a = αa
otherwise.
In order to analyze the delegation problem we proceed now by showing that in our
context the Median Voter Theorem (MVT) is applicable.
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Following Black (1948) we know that in any one dimensional policy problem the median
voter’s most preferred policy choice will win any pairwise vote over any other policy
candidate if the agents exhibit single peaked preferences over the policy choices11.
First note that we deal with a one dimensional policy problem, as the question at hand
is in the end what amount ma to spend in the contest. As we have shown above the
decision how much to spend corresponds one to one to the decision which delegate to
have in the contest. Now for the Median Voter Theorem to be applicable we have to show
single peakedness.
There is a one-to-one mapping from the spending decision to the type decision as
any pair (ma,mb) can be generated by choosing a pair of politicians
(
α
P
a , α
P
b
)
and the
functions for ma and mb respectively are strictly increasing in the politician’s type. Thus
we focus only on the decision over types. Above we derived the reaction function in the
delegate’s type space for an arbitrary group member. Now we show that the utility has a
unique peak on this reaction function for any group member for any given delegate type
of the other group.
The optimal value of αPa for an arbitrary type α
i
a is given by α
P
a =
αiaα
P
b
2αP
b
−αia
. The derivative
is given by
∂u
∂αPa
=
RαPb
(αPa + α
p
b)
3
(
αiaα
P
a + α
i
aα
P
b − 2αPa αPb
)
.
Thus we know that
sgn(
∂u
∂αPa
) = sgn(αiaα
P
a + α
i
aα
P
b − 2αPa αPb ).
Now plugging in k α
i
aα
P
a
2αPa −α
i
a
and checking for k < 1 (left of the reaction function) and
k > 1 (right of the reaction function) gives
sgn(
∂u
∂αPa
) = +1 for k < 1
11See Mueller (2003) for a more recent exposition of the Median Voter Theorem.
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and
sgn(
∂u
∂αPa
) = −1 for k > 1.
Thus, as needed for single peakedness, utility is strictly increasing in αPa to the left of
the optimal choice and strictly decreasing in αPa to the right of the optimal choice. As
argued above for the vertical part of the reaction functions where the optimal choice of
αPa is restricted by αa utility is strictly increasing until αa . Single peakedness is therefore
automatically ensured and the Median Voter Theorem is applicable.
Lemma 2 Given the one dimensional policy problem with single peaked preferences we
can analyze the delegation problem as the median voter’s optimization problem.
5.4 One sided delegation
A natural starting point for the analysis of the delegation decision is the situation where
only one country delegates. Without loss of generality we restrict our analysis to the
case where country a has this option. An interpretation of this situation would be that
the population in country b has homogenous valuation of the rent or that in country b
institutional features hinder delegation.
In the case of one sided delegation we only have to closely inspect the above derived re-
action function of country a’s median voter αMa . As shown above his valuation determines
country a’s delegation decision. To ease exposition we assume without loss of generality
that in country b the median type acts in the contest.
Proposition 3 In the case of onesided delegation the optimal delegation decision depends
solely on the type of the median and on the type of the other country’s acting politician.
The best response is given by αP
∗
a =
αM
b
αMa
2αM
b
−αMa
if
αM
b
αMa
2αM
b
−αMa
< αa and by α
P ∗
a = αa otherwise.
A closer inspection of this reaction function tells us more about when country a wants
to delegate to more radical or less radical politicians.
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Proposition 4 If αMa < α
M
b the median group member prefers to send a group member
that values the rent less than him into the contest ( delegation to a less aggressive type).
If αMa > α
M
b the median group member prefers to send a group member that values the
rent more than him into the contest ( delegation to a more aggressive type).
If αMa = α
M
b the median group member prefers to act himself in the contest, i.e. α
P ∗
a =
αMa .
Here we already see the basic logic of delegation at work. Delegation leads to an
amplification of initial differences which makes the actual contest more asymmetric. We
will use the insights from this simple case in the analysis of what follows.
5.5 Sequential Delegation
Now we allow both countries to decide which citizen to send into the contest (two sided
delegation). Again we first look at an analytically simpler situation in which country a
has to appoint its politician before country b does. In what follows we refer to this case
as sequential delegation.
We solve the problem by backwards induction and first have a look at country b ’s
problem where the median citizen has to decide upon delegation.
max
αP
b
uM = αMb R
m∗b
m∗a + m
∗
b
+ (Bb −m∗b) .
Using our results for m∗a and m
∗
b and deriving the the first order condition we get the
by now familiar expression for the optimal choice of αPb :
αP
∗
b =
αPa α
M
b
2αPa − αMb
.
Lemma 5 The best response function for αMb is given by α
P ∗
b =
αPa α
M
b
2αPa −α
M
b
if
αM
b
αMa
2αMa −α
M
b
< αa
and by αP
∗
b = αb otherwise.
76 CHAPTER 5. A MODEL OF DELEGATION IN CONTESTS
Anticipating the behavior of the country b median and the behavior of the politicians
the country a median faces the following optimization problem:
max
αPa
uM = αMa R
m∗a
m∗a + m
∗
b
−m∗a
Using the equilibrium values of m∗a , m
∗
b and α
P ∗
b , this becomes:
max
αPa
R
[
αMa
2
− αMb
(
αMb + 2α
M
a
) 1
4αPa
]
.
As can be seen easily, utility strictly increases in αPa . Thus it is optimal to choose α
P ∗
a =
αa. This means that it is optimal for the group a median to delegate the negotiations to
the most aggressive group member, irrespective of his relative aggressiveness as compared
to country b’s median.
Plugging this into αMb ’s best response function we get α
P ∗
b =
αaαMb
2αa−αMb
.
Proposition 6 In the sequential move game the first mover chooses to delegate as radi-
cally as possible
(
αP
∗
a = αa
)
whereas the second mover accommodates
(
αP
∗
b =
αaαMb
2αa−αMb
)
.
For αa →∞ we find that α∗b converges to α
M
b
2
. This result is independent of whether the
first or the second moving median is more radical.
This result deserves some consideration for several reasons. First of all, it tells us
that the result from the delegation case will differ from the one of standard rent seek-
ing games. While standard rent seeking games predict also asymmetric equilibria for
symmetric players in a sequential situation, the model of delegated rent seeking predicts
extremely asymmetric equilibria in its sequential version and thus makes the standard
result more pronounced. This result parallels the analysis of Cournot and Stackelberg
models in Industrial Organization.
Secondly, the model gives us a clear prediction of the way in which the asymmetry
works: The group that is able to appoint a negotiator first has a first mover advantage
as the appointment of a negotiator presents a fait accompli to the second group. Namely,
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the first country will use its first moving advantage in order to delegate the rent seeking
to its most radical member, thereby making fighting for the rent more costly for the other
group. Consequently, in equilibrium the share of the rent (and the utility for the median
type) the first moving country can get will be significantly greater than the other country’s
share (see Appendix 10.3). This holds as long as α¯ is sufficiently large, namely α¯ > 2αMb .
I.e., as long as delegation is a powerful instrument it ensures an advantage. The result is
particularly striking for groups that are absolutely identical.
Note that our result that both countries prefer to have the first moving advantage
contradicts Baik and Shogren’s (1992) result that the underdog (in our case the country
with the less aggressive median) wants to move first whilst the top dog happily waits for
its turn.
5.6 Simultaneous Delegation - Asymmetry
We now look at the situation where the medians delegate simultaneously. Using the above
derived equilibrium values of the final stage game we can solve for the best reply functions
of the median types in the type space.
The problem of the median voter in countries a and b respectively is to choose a politi-
cian that will maximize their utility given his behavior in the final stage game
max
αPa
uM = αMa R
ma
ma + mb
+ (Ba −ma)
max
αP
b
uM = αMb R
mb
ma + mb
+ (Bb −mb) .
We can use the equilibrium values for m∗a and m
∗
b and derive the first order conditions
and get again the best reply functions in the politician’s type space:
αP
∗
a =
αM
b
αMa
2αM
b
−αMa
if
αM
b
αMa
2αM
b
−αMa
< αa and α
P ∗
a = αa otherwise for country a.
αP
∗
b =
αM
b
αMa
2αMa −α
M
b
if
αMa α
M
b
2αMa −α
M
b
< αb and α
P ∗
b = αb otherwise for country b.
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Figure 5.2: Simultaneous Delegation - Asymmetry
These functions have an interesting property. They are symmetric around the bisecting
line. And, if one neglects for a moment the restriction that αP
∗
a/b < αa/b , we can see
that for αMa = α
M
b , i.e. perfectly symmetrical countries, they coincide for positive values
of αP
∗
a/b. If however α
M
a 6= αMb they do not intersect at all, i.e. there does not exist an
equilibrium in pure strategies. We will treat those two cases separately.
We start with the generic case where countries’ medians differ in their valuation, i.e.
αMa 6= αMb . Without loss of generality we focus on the case where αMa < αMb . In this
case we can use our above derived results and find that the unique intersection of the best
response functions is given by the point where αMb delegates to his most radical option,
αP
∗
b = αb , and α
M
a accommodates by choosing α
P ∗
a =
αbα
M
a
(2αb−αMa )
. It is interesting that
we get this result of extreme polarization independent of the difference in the median
types, i.e. initially only marginal differences are drastically amplified and lead to very
asymmetric equilibria.
Proposition 7 If countries are asymmetric, i.e. αMa < α
M
b (w.l.o.g.), there is a unique
equilibrium characterized by αMb delegating to α
P ∗
b = αb , i.e. as radically as possible, and
αMa accommodating and delegating to α
P ∗
a =
αbα
M
a
(2αb−αMa )
. This polarization is independent
of the degree of the countries’ asymmetry.
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Figure 5.3: Asymmetry - No Equilibrium
Note that even if country b can delegate very extremely, i.e. αb →∞ , we get country
a still delegating not to the lowest type.
Lemma 8 For αb →∞ we find that αP ∗a converges to αMa /2 .
Note that non-delegated rent seeking predicts asymmetric equilibria as well, if the rent
seekers valuation of the rent is different. It is easy to show however that even in this case
the asymmetry will be more pronounced in the case of delegated rent seeking.
Note however, that this equilibrium was sort of forced by the fact that we restricted
the support to αP
∗
b ≤ αb . If we allow for unbounded support this equilibrium ceases to
exist and we do not find a pure strategy equilibrium12 (see Figure 5.3).
Lemma 9 If the support of α is not bounded by α there exist no pure strategy equilibria.
12We tried to show existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium, but none of the standard existence
proofs has bite in our model (see e.g. Reny (1999) or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)). The
intuition seems to be against the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium. Because no matter how far
we push α out the extremely asymmetric nature of the pure strategy equilibrium persists. But the very
moment we really go to the limit of α →∞ the nature of the (mixed strategy) equilibrium would change
non-continuously.
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However, as the existence of an infinitely radical citizen seems to be not the empirically
most relevant case we neglect this particularity in the remainder of the analysis and
assume that there exists a maximum type α.
5.6.1 Aggregate Waste under Delegation and No Delega-
tion
Now we are going to analyze whether there is an effect of delegation on social welfare.
We compare whether aggregate waste differs in a situation where delegation is possible as
compared to a situation where the median type himself acts. Recall that aggregate waste
in the latter case can be written as m∗a + m
∗
b = R
αMa α
M
b
αMa +α
M
b
. In the case of delegation we
have seen above that equilibrium waste always is given by m∗a + m
∗
b = R
αMa
2
13.
Now we compare these by subtracting the two expressions and checking the sign.
sgn[R
αMb α
M
a
αMb + α
M
a
−Rα
M
a
2
] = sgn[
2αMb α
M
a − αMb
(
αMb + α
M
a
)
(αMb + α
M
a ) 2
]
= sgn[αMb α
M
a − αMb αMb ]
= sgn[αMa − αMb ]
> 0
This leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 10 The possibility of delegation leads to social improvement due to a reduc-
tion in aggregate waste in the case of asymmetric countries.
Again this result is due to the (by delegation extremely pronounced) asymmetry of
the equilibrium. A standard result in contest theory is that more asymmetric equilibria
imply less waste as the “race is decided before the start”. We term this allocation a
second best allocation given that it is not possible to eliminate rent seeking contests as a
13We get that by noting that αMa < α
M
b . Thus we know α
P∗
b = αb , and α
P∗
a =
αbα
M
a
(2αb−αMa )
which leads
to m∗a + m
∗
b = R
αM
a
2 .
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whole. This may imply interesting policy implications for designing optimal contests as
a social planner interested in reducing the amount of resources spent in rent seeking who
is not able to eliminate the rent or to suppress the competition14 still can try to design
the structure of the contest such that groups are able/forced to delegate.
5.7 Simultaneous Delegation - Symmetry
In the non generic case where αMa = α
M
b = α
M countries are perfectly symmetric in terms
of the technological prerequisites and the preferences of the median citizen. In this case
there exists a continuum of equilibria as the reaction function coincide (as noted above)
(See Figure 5.4).
Proposition 11 For αMa = α
M
b a continuum of equilibria exists in the simultaneous
delegation game.
There is no a priori reason why one of these equilibria should have more appeal than
the others but we can compare these equilibria with respect to some variables of interest.
5.7.1 Utility Ranking
First we compare these equilibria with respect to the utility country a’s median receives
in them. From that we can see which equilibrium this agent would choose if he had the
power to determine which equilibrium should be played.
As a first step we write m∗a and m
∗
b as functions of α
P
a :
m∗a = R
(
2αPa α
M − (αM)2)
4αPa
and m∗b = R
(
αM
)2
4αPa
14It might indeed be difficult, if not impossible to eliminate rents in an economy. The same is true
for the suppression of rent seeking activities which can take numerous different visible and invisible
forms. Mueller(1989) points out, that “rents are omnipresent. They exist whenever the information and
mobility asymmetries impede the flow of resources. They exist in private good markets, factor markets,
asset markets and political markets. Where rents exist, rent seeking can be expected to exist.”
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Figure 5.4: Symmetry - Continuum of Equilibria
.
Using this expressions and using that αMa = α
M
b = α
M we can write the utility of country
1’s median voter as uMa =
1
2
RαM− R(α
M)
2
4αPa
. We can easily see, that this expression strictly
increases in αPa and reaches a maximum at α
P
a = αa .
Lemma 12 Country a median prefers most the equilibrium where he delegates to his most
radical option αa .
This result parallels the analysis of our sequential case where it was most desirable to
be the first mover and delegate as extreme as possible. Thus it seems hardly surprising
that in this case this type of equilibrium is preferred, too.
5.7.2 Waste Ranking
Another matter of interest is the social planner’s perspective. Thus we compare the
equilibria with respect to the aggregate waste, i.e. the sum of the resources invested in
the contest. To do so we again express m∗a and m
∗
b as functions of α
P
a and use the fact
that αMa = α
M
b = α
M . Thus we get for the aggregate waste m∗a + m
∗
b = R
αM
2
which is
constant. Thus we can state the following Lemma.
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Lemma 13 The aggregate waste is constant for all equilibria.
As there is no initial difference to be amplified delegation apparently looses its bite in
the symmetric case.
5.8 Extensions
5.8.1 Countries with Differing Budgets
This first extension is merely an observation. If we look at the median citizens’ problems
uMa = α
M
a R
ma
ma + mb
+ (Ba −ma)
uMb = α
M
b R
mb
ma + mb
+ (Bb −mb)
we see that we can allow for the budgets to differ. However due to the structure of the
problem these budgets do not show up in the first order conditions. As the values of m∗a
and m∗b are defined as absolute values they are independent of the available budget.
If we are now willing to accept the share of GDP spent on military as an empirical
measure of country radicalization our model generates the commonly observed result that
smaller/poorer countries spend a larger share of their budget on their military. This is
admittedly due to the primitives of our model as we do not control for (dis-)economies of
scale in the provision of the public good. However it is reassuring that the simple model
delivers this empirically backed stylized fact.
Lemma 14 Richer countries tend to be less radicalized.
5.8.2 Heterogeneity with Respect to the Cost of Public
Good Provision
Again looking at the median citizens’ problems we can also allow for differing efficiency
ka and kb in providing the public good. A higher value for ka/b expresses here a higher
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opportunity cost of resources spent in the contest as more of the public good consumption
is foregone.
uMa = α
M
a R
ma
ma + mb
+ ka (Ba −ma)
uMb = α
M
b R
mb
ma + mb
+ kb (Bb −mb)
The analysis is basically the same as above and leads to equilibrium expenses in the
contest given by
m∗a = R
(
αPa
ka
)2 (
αP
b
kb
)
((
αPa
ka
)
+
(
αP
b
kb
))2 and m∗b = R
(
αPa
ka
) (
αP
b
kb
)2
((
αPa
ka
)
+
(
αP
b
kb
))2 .
Using that we can solve for the best responses in the politician type space, again similar
to above:
αP
∗
a =
kaα
P
b α
M
a
2αPb ka − αMa kb
and αP
∗
b =
kbα
P
a α
M
b
2αPa kb − αMb ka
.
Now performing comparative statics with respect to the efficiency of public goods provi-
sion, ka/b , leads us to conclude that an increase in the efficiency of public good provision,
e.g. better developed infrastructure, leads to less radical delegation, i.e. an inward shift
of the best response function, and thus has the same effect as a lower valuation of the
median citizen.
∂(αPa )
∂ka
= −αMa αPb kbα
M
a
(kbαMa −2kaαPb )
2 < 0 (analogous for country b)
Proposition 15 Better developed countries tend to delegate less radically.
5.8.3 Costly Concessions
In the literature on delegated bargaining15 the actual bargaining can be delegated to
agents who have differing costs of taking back an initial demand. The higher this cost,
15See Muthoo (1999) for a comprehensive survey.
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the more credible the initial commitment is. I.e. by delegating to an agent with high
costs of conceding one can ensure a high share of the pie.
In our context Mo (1995) analyzed the question how much decision authority to give
to a delegate. In the US for some international issues domestic institutions retain a veto
right to overrule presidential decisions. One could include this feature in our model and
would again get some sort of a theory of domestic institutions. However in our basic
model one would expect that one wants always an as strong as possible commitment in
the delegation decision.
5.8.4 Bundling of Issues
We have only looked on one dimensional issues. In reality one can observe that quite
commonly several issues are bundled and rent seeking takes place in several dimensions at
once. Now an normative analysis could be applied what kinds of issues should be bundled
or kept separately respectively. Should the social planner put together issues where both
parties have similarly high valuations, or should she try to create an already asymmetric
initial situation to start with by bundling differently valued issues?
5.8.5 Endogenous Specialization
Another question related to the analysis of multidimensional issues is the question what
kind of delegate groups will send into a contest if the delegate has to contest simultaneously
for several issues. In a model with two separate issues 1 and 2 we expect that delegation
will lead to “endogenous specialization”, meaning that one country will elect an politician
very keen on issue 1 and moderate on issue 2 whilst the other country will elect just the
other way around, in that way coordinating on their respective claims. The exact analysis
of this problem may be very interesting in a field next to public choice, namely Industrial
Organization.
Consider a situation where two firms compete in two different product markets. By
hiring a manager who is clearly in favor of one of the markets (thus more inclined to spend
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money on R&D or advertising in this market) the two firms can avoid intense competition
on both markets and both secure themselves their market with barely challenged monopoly
rents. If the same logic as in our model applies we hope to get also a unique equilibrium
in which initial differences are amplified16.
The decision what CEO to hire is generally considered to be an important signal for
markets. Recent examples are the Deutsche Bank who set clear sign of their orientation to
investment banking when making Josef Ackermann their new CEO in 2002 or Ford who
hired the former BMW manager Wolfgang Reizle for their “Premium Group” in 1999.
5.9 Conclusion
This chapter presented a simple model of delegation in contests. We have shown that
the equilibria that tend to arise seem to be characterized by a high degree of asymmetry.
This can be due to two factors. In the sequential game, the asymmetry was simply due to
the first mover advantage in the delegation game. Using this advantage, the first moving
group could secure itself a higher share of the expected rent. Even in the simultaneous
game asymmetry is likely to arise although for different reasons. Here we found that a
median group member that is only slightly more radical than her opponent in the other
group will decide to give the rent seeking power to its most radical and aggressive member.
The other group’s median accommodates by delegating to a rather moderate politician.
Thus initial asymmetries are amplified by delegation. Further we showed that delegated
rent seeking implies by its asymmetry that less resources will be spend in the contest than
under non-delegation.
If one is willing to go some way in interpreting our model one could interpret the US
electing the hawkish Ronald Reagan in 1981 being followed by dovish Mikhail Gorbachev
coming into power in the USSR in 1985 as being consistent with the predictions of our
sequential model.
Finally we would like to stress that the main implications of our model are testable. Our
16An example of a somewhat related reasoning for intra-firm conflicts can be found in Rotemberg and
Saloner (1995).
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model identifies not only the circumstances under which the median group member will
be decisive, but although to whom he wants to delegate the decision and what resource
spending in the rent seeking contest this implies. Finally, our model predicts extremely
asymmetric spending of both groups in the rent seeking contest. Taking that into account
it should be possible to test the model of delegated rent seeking against conventional
models of rent seeking.
Looking at the issues pointed out in the last section it appears to be that the reasoning
applied in this chapter can be fruitfully enriched and applied to other issues. As well in
the field of public choice as in other fields such as Industrial Organization. We believe
that this avenue is an interesting one and worthwhile to pursue.
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5.10 Appendix
5.10.1 Derivation of Reaction Function for General Con-
stant Returns to Scale Contest Success Function
Utility of country a citizen
ua = α
i
aR
θma
θma+pimb
+ (Ba −ma)
Utility of country b citizen
ub = α
i
bR
pimb
θma+pimb
+ (Bb −mb)
From the FOCs we can derive the reaction functions in the contest stage
m∗a =
√
Rαiapimb√
θ
− mbpi
θ
and m∗b =
√
maRβθ√
pi
− maθ
pi
and derive the equilibrium spending
m∗a = R
αib (α
i
a)
2
θpi
(αibpi + α
i
aθ)
2 and m
∗
b = R
(αib)
2
αiaθpi
(αibpi + α
i
aθ)
2 .
The problem of the median citizens in countries a and b is given by
max
αPa
ua = α
M
a R
θma
θma + pimb
+ (Ba −ma)
max
αP
b
ub = α
M
b R
pimb
θma + pimb
+ (Bb −mb)
or using the equilibrium values for m∗a and m
∗
b as
max
αPa
R
αMa
(
αPa
)2
θ2 + αMa α
P
a α
P
b θpi − αPb
(
αPa
)2
θpi
(αPb pi + α
P
a θ)
2
max
αP
b
R
αMb piα
P
b α
P
a θ + α
M
b (β)
2 pi2 − (αPb )2 αPa θpi
(αPb pi + α
P
a θ)
2 .
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Again we can derive the reaction functions in the politicians type space
αP
∗
a =
piαMa α
P
b
2piαPb − θαMa
αP
∗
b =
θαMb α
P
a
(2θαPa − piαMb )
which are qualitatively equivalent to our formulation. Thus the results hold for this
more general formulation, too.
5.10.2 Derivation of the Reaction Function
Here we proof the optimality of delegating to αa if α
P
b <
αiaαa
(2αa−αia)
.
For αPb ∈
[
αia
2
, α
i
aαa
(2αa−αia)
]
the optimality is shown by checking that left of the reaction
function, i.e. for αPa <
αiaα
P
a
2αPa −α
i
a
utility is strictly increasing in αPa .
The derivative ∂u
∂αPa
is given by
∂u
∂αPa
=
RαPb
(αPa + α
p
b)
3
(
αiaα
P
a + α
i
aα
P
b − 2αPa αPb
)
.
Thus we know that
sgn(
∂u
∂αPa
) = sgn(αiaα
P
a + α
i
aα
P
b − 2αPa αPb ).
Left of the reaction function it holds that αPa = k
αiaα
P
a
2αPa −α
i
a
for k < 1.
Plugging this in gives sgn( ∂u
∂αPa
) = +1 for k < 1.
For β ∈ (0, αia
2
] we repeat the exercise:
∂u
∂αPa
=
RαPb
(αPa + α
p
b)
3
(
αiaα
P
a + α
i
aα
P
b − 2αPa αPb
)
.
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Thus again we know that
sgn(
∂u
∂αPa
) = sgn(αiaα
P
a + α
i
aα
P
b − 2αPa αPb ).
Now we check for αPb <
αia
2
, i.e. αPb = k
αia
2
for k < 1 that utility is strictly increasing in
αPa .
sgn(
∂u
∂αPa
) = sgn
(
αiaα
P
a (1− k) + αia
kαia
2
)
= +1
As utility is strictly increasing in αPa it is optimal to choose in these cases α
P
a = αa.
5.10.3 Utility Comparison in the Sequential Move Game
Without loss of generality we assume that the country a politician moves first. From the
analysis we know that αP
∗
a = αa and α
P ∗
b =
αaαMb
2αa−αMb
.
The utility of the first mover is (after using our results on m∗a and m
∗
b) given by
ua =
RαMa
(
αPa
)2
+ RαMa α
P
a α
P
b −R
(
αPa
)2
αPb
(αPa + α
P
b )
2 + Ba.
The utility of the second mover is (after using our results on m∗a and m
∗
b) given by
ub =
RαMb
(
αPb
)2
+ RαMb α
P
a α
P
b −RαPa
(
αPb
)2
(αPa + α
P
b )
2 + Bb.
Now use αP
∗
a = αa and α
P ∗
b =
αaαMb
2αa−αMb
and assume Ba = Bb = B.
ua = B +
αa
3R(
αa +
αaαMb
2αa−αMb
)2
ub = B +
αa
3R(
αa +
αaαMb
2αa−αMb
)2
(
αMb
)2
(2αa − αMb )2
Now it is easily seen that ua > ub whenever(
αMb
)2
(2αa − αMb )2
< 1
For αa sufficiently large, i.e. αa > 2α
M
b , this is always true.
Chapter 6
A brief Survey on Overconfidence
The chance of gain is by every man more or less overvalued, and the chance
of loss is by most men undervalued.
Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776, Book I, Chapter X)
6.1 Introduction
The widespread presence of overconfidence - in various forms - is a well understood and
basically unchallenged fact. Several incidences of psychological trivia stem from the field
like Svenson’s (1981) study showing that 80% of drivers in Texas believe their driving
ability is above average or Lehman and Nisbett’s (1985) finding that people are well aware
that half of US marriages fail but are convinced theirs won’t fail. Another popular fact
is reported by Taylor and Brown (1988) who report a survey that shows that depressive
people have the most realistic self perception.
6.2 Overconfidence in Psychology
While in the Economics and Finance literature only recently researchers became interested
in the analysis of causes and consequences of overconfidence there have been studies on
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the issue in psychology for a long time. These basically try to document the presence and
the form of this cognitive bias using mostly data from interviews and surveys, partly also
from experiments.
In this literature there is an array of phenomena that comes under the common label
of overconfidence, like too narrow confidence intervals, self serving bias, illusion of control
and overoptimism.
In psychological studies it is well documented that people tend to overestimate the
precision of their predictions of uncertain events. E.g. in Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein
(1977) or in Alpert and Raiffa (1982) it is found that people name dramatically too narrow
confidence intervals for their estimates. Russo and Shoemaker (1992) find this also for
their study of professional managers who perceive their judgement to be too exact.
The presence of a self serving bias is also well documented in numerous studies. E.g.
Miller and Ross (1975), Langer and Roth (1975) or Nisbett and Ross (1980) find that
people tend to account their success mainly on their own ability whilst it is mainly due
to luck. Bettman and Weitz (1983) find evidence for this behavior amongst executives in
their analysis of annual reports of firms.
Closely related to the self serving bias is the illusion of control. Langer (1975) finds
evidence for it when she finds that people strongly prefer lottery tickets that they picked
themselves as compared to randomly assigned ones. Fleming and Darley (1986) look at
dice throwing experiments and find there, too, that players tend to believe that they
could control the dice’s outcome. Finally this phenomenon is documented also in the
business world where studies by Langer (1975), Weinstein (1980) and March and Shapira
(1987) show that CEOs who have chosen an investment project are likely to feel illusion
of control and to strongly underestimate the likelihood of project failure.
The last phenomenon subsumed under the label of overconfidence is overoptimism where
people believe favorable events to be more likely than they actually are. Alpert and Raiffa
(1982), Buehler, Griffin, and Ross (1994), Weinstein (1980) and Kunda (1987) find that
people think good things happen more often to them than to their peers. Langer and
Roth (1975), Weinstein (1980) and Taylor and Brown (1988) find that people are overly
optimistic about their own ability as compared to others.
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Already early on psychologists understood the possible importance of their findings for
businesses and started studying the phenomena in this environment. Kidd and Morgan
(1969) found that electric utility managers consistently underestimated the downtime of
generating equipment. Larwood and Whittaker (1977) studied a sample of corporate
presidents and found them to be unrealistic in their predictions of success. Cooper, Woo,
and Dunkelberg (1988) look at entrepreneurs who overestimate their chances of success
with their business. In their sample of 2994 entrepreneurs 81% believe their chances to
survive are better than 70% and 33% believe they will survive for sure. In reality 75% of
new ventures did not survive the first 5 years.
Frank (1935) and Weinstein (1980) provide evidence that people are especially overcon-
fident about projects to which they are highly committed. This would be a rationale for
a CEO’s overconfidence concerning his own projects. He can be thought of being highly
committed since his compensation contract ties personal wealth to the company’s stock
price and, hence, to the outcomes of corporate investment decisions.
6.3 Foundations
The above section has shown that the several forms of overconfidence are well documented
by psychological studies. Following a Friedman–type argument it appears that agents
exhibiting overconfidence or overoptimism even in market environments (like the many
business examples above have shown) are at odds with a rational actor using Bayesian
techniques to process information. The latter is supposedly the type best equipped to pass
the competitive market test. Thus recently there were several attempts to explain the
presence and survival of overconfident types in an economic framework and environment.
Van den Steen (2002) and Compte and Postlewaite (2004) analyze the possible reasons
for self serving biases leading to overconfidence. Van den Steen (2002) derives it from
differing priors. Agents start out holding different priors. Dependent on the belief there
is an optimal action (which can be observed by all agents) to be taken. If an agent is
successful he will think his right action choice was the cause whilst he will assign others’
success to luck. In effect he ends up with an explanation for overconfidence with respect
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to own ability and with self serving bias.
Compte and Postlewaite (2004) look at a situation where they assume that optimism
per se increases performance and find that it is optimal to distort information processing
such that successes are regarded as being due to own ability as overoptimism increases
the welfare of agents.
Brunnermeier and Parker (2004) take a very different approach. In their normative
model agents have to trade off current well being - which can be raised by overly optimistic
estimates of the probability of good future events - and future well being - which is
reduced by distorted decisions due to overoptimism, e.g. savings. In this setting beliefs
are optimally, meaning in a utility maximizing way, distorted towards overconfidence.
In a different vein evolutionary approaches study the chances of survival for overcon-
fident types. Heifetz and Spiegel (2001) employ such an evolutionary approach. In their
dynamic evolutionary model they show that rational Bayesian players are not a necessary
consequence of evolution but that generically optimism will survive. In their model the
bias helps to commit to a higher degree of effort and thus gives an advantage.
Although they also look at evolutionary dynamics, Bernardo and Welch (2001) focus on
another aspect. They look at an economy where private information is inefficiently under-
used as the agents are predominantly herding. Thus no new information is generated by
experimenting agents. In their model an overconfident “entrepreneur” who underestimates
the risk of his action is willing to take a chance and experiment. Thus overconfidence helps
to provide a public good, namely new information about business opportunities. Therefore
groups with (moderately) overconfident members have an evolutionary advantage. On the
one hand group selection works in favor of overconfidence whilst individual selection works
against it as overconfident entrepreneurs die more often due to their too risky endeavors.
The social optimum trades off the informational externality provided by the entrepreneur
against the attrition, i.e. higher death rates of entrepreneurs.
Hvide (2000) also makes a quasi evolutionary argument. In his model overconfidence
serves as a commitment device in bargaining. As agents are overly optimistic about their
own abilities they overestimate their outside option. He calls overconfidence therefore
“pragmatic beliefs” as they are most useful to an agent.
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Closely related to evolutionary approaches are tournaments, as evolution can be in-
terpreted as a sequence of tournaments where prizes are higher offspring rates. Another
approach is taken by Goel and Thakor (2002) and by Kra¨hmer (2003). They show that
overconfidence enhances the chances to succeed in tournaments or contests. Goel and
Thakor (2002) look at managers who perceive their situation to be less risky than it actu-
ally is. Now groups of managers with performance pay compete in promotion tournaments
where the most successful agent is going to be promoted. In this setting managers have to
trade off the payoff from choosing high risk projects with higher return and the risk that
means for their performance tied compensation. Overconfident managers are more willing
to take the risk and are ceteris paribus more likely ending up winning the promotion.
Kra¨hmer (2003) looks at a sequence of contests where effort and ability are comple-
ments. In this setting a better belief about one’s own ability leads to exertion of more
effort and therefore a higher chance of winning. Success in a contest leads to a positive
updating of the belief about own ability and to a still better belief about this ability. This
in turn gives higher chances of winning future contests. He can show that even with an
infinite horizon only incomplete learning of true ability may occur and overconfidence is
likely to persist. Moreover we can see that initial overconfidence enhances the chances of
a player to succeed.
6.4 Applications in Finance
Finance was the first field of economics to employ overconfidence in order to explain
market anomalies. In all the finance applications covered here overconfidence means
being too optimistic about signal precision.
Kyle and Wang (1997) construct a model of competing funds that hire managers to
trade in a model a la Kyle (1984,1985). In models of this type trading volume depends on
signal precision and thus hiring overconfident fund managers can serve as a commitment
device to trade more aggressively. They show that overconfidence is unilaterally beneficial
but the funds end up in a prisoner’s dilemma type of situation as both have lower profits
than with standard managers. They also show that overconfidence can be imitated by an
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appropriately designed incentive scheme.
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) look at markets with overconfident in-
vestors and find that under this assumption there is under-reaction to public information.
Gervais and Odean (2001) develop a model where overconfidence emerges endogenously
as success is attributed to own ability whilst failure is not. They find that more confident
traders trade more. However, taking a dynamic perspective they show that over time
overconfident traders converge back to a realistic assessment of the situation. It is im-
portant to note that though overconfidence is associated with wealth it is not its cause.
Wealthier traders are successful traders who are, due to their previous success, overcon-
fident. They develop three hypotheses that are all backed by the data. First, periods
of market increases with many successful and thus overconfident traders are followed by
periods with higher trading volume. This is confirmed by Statman and Thorley (1998).
Second, periods with higher trading volumes (due to overconfidence) go in hand with
lower profits. This is confirmed by Barber and Odean (2001). Third, the highest degree
of overconfidence can be found by young successful traders. Those tend to trade more.
This is again consistent with Barber and Odean (2001)1.
6.5 Applications in other Fields
There are several papers using overconfidence in other fields as well. Manove (1995) looks
at a dynamic context and shows that overconfident entrepreneurs who overestimate their
success probability allocate resources inefficiently but may be more willing to exert effort
or accumulate more capital as they overestimate future returns. In the long run they may
survive even in a competitive equilibrium.
Manove and Padilla (1999) analyze a bank’s problem to screen entrepreneurs looking
for credit financing when a fraction of the latter is overconfident with respect to their
project’s quality. The standard screening methods do not have bite anymore as in fact bad
1Interestingly for the analysis in the next chapter Barber and Odean (2001) moreover find that ob-
servable characteristics can help in predicting a person’s degree of overconfidence as they find that men
are more prone to overconfidence than women.
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entrepreneurs actually think that they have great projects. This leads to too conservative
banking and an additional welfare loss.
Schultz (2001) addresses in a non–technical paper the point that despite dramatic
progress in consumer research product failure rates have remained on a high level. He
argues that overconfidence might account for the fact that managers constantly overesti-
mate the success chances of their (pet) projects which leads to constantly high product
failure rates despite better marketing research techniques.
Roll (1986) uses CEO overconfidence to explain why many mergers are ex–post value
destroying. He argues that managers are too optimistic about the performance of their
acquisitions as they overestimate synergies etc. This leads to too high take over bids and
in turn ex–post to loss making takeovers.
Van den Steen (2001) interprets a manager’s overconfidence in the success of a certain
type of projects as vision. Similar to Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) this vision enhances
lower tier workers’ incentives as they can be more confident that their projects will be
approved if they are of the right type. Van den Steen also addresses the issue of sorting
and finds that visionary managers will attract workers with a preference for the manager’s
pet projects.
Malmendier and Tate (2003) and Malmendier and Tate (forthcoming) look at a sample
of 477 Forbes 500 companies from 1980 to 1994. They construct an instrument to control
for CEO overconfidence where they use information on the CEOs stockholding in own
company stock. Interestingly for the analysis in the next chapter they find that CEO
overconfidence can be well predicted by observable characteristics like an MBA degree,
the birth cohort, military service, etc.
In Malmendier and Tate (2003) they show that overconfident CEOs do more mergers
as they overestimate their success probability due to their misperception of own ability.
These mergers are value destroying. They can further show that this behavior is most
common in firms with a lot of free cash flow as there is less of a market corrective bal-
ancing the CEO’s overconfidence. In Malmendier and Tate (forthcoming) the investment
behavior is analyzed. As overconfident CEOs overestimate the return of their investment
projects they invest too aggressively. Again this effect is more pronounced in firms with a
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lot of free internal cash flow as there the market corrective is missing. They find all their
hypotheses confirmed in their data.
Finally, Dubra (2004) looks at the role of overconfidence in a labor market search
problem and finds that overconfident agents tend to search longer as they overestimate
the chances to find a better offer.
All the above papers have focussed on the downside of overconfident agents. But there
are also a couple of papers focussing on the possible advantages of overconfidence. Goel
and Thakor (2002) and Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2004) address similar points. Goel
and Thakor model overconfident managers who perceive their situation to be less risky.
In this framing overconfidence is beneficial for a firm as the risk averse managers’ pref-
erences are better aligned with the risk neutral firm owners’ preferences. In the same
vein is Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2004). There the risk averse managers have to be
given stock options to provide them incentives to maximize expected firm value. If a
manager is overconfident he has to receive less stock options to choose optimal projects,
i.e. overconfidence lowers agency costs. Moreover they argue that giving these overcon-
fident managers the same level of stock options induces excessive risk taking and is thus
counterproductive. In their model monetary incentives and overconfidence are therefore
alternative solutions to the underlying agency problem.
Ando (2004) analyzes the role of overconfidence in contests. He models the contest as
an all pay auction where an agent may overestimate his own ability which is interpreted
as the agent’s valuation in standard auction terminology. This leads to more aggressive
bidding (or effort exertion) as the optimal bid is, as standard in the auction literature,
strictly increasing in the valuation. He also analyzes an alternative way to model relative
overconfidence and allows players to underestimate the opponent’s ability. Under this
specification low ability players increase their effort but high ability players decrease it.
Gervais and Goldstein (2004) look at a team production problem with complementari-
ties. One of the team members now is overconfident, i.e. overestimates his own productiv-
ity. Thus it is optimal for this agent to exert more effort as his perceived marginal return
is higher. The other team members anticipate this and due to the technological comple-
mentarities they also increase their effort. Thus overconfidence of team members leads to
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a more efficient outcome. Looking at the problem in a dynamic perspective the higher
output is interpreted by the overconfident agent as a signal for his own high ability as he
does not take into account the effect that the other’s have exerted more effort due to his
overconfidence. Thus there is only imperfect learning of true productivity types. Gervais
and Goldstein also analyze the influence of monitoring and find that overconfidence and
monitoring are substitutes.
The next section now focusses on the strategic commitment value a firm can extract
from hiring an overconfident manager and thus gain a competitive edge in product market
competition.
frei
Chapter 7
A Strategic Rationale for
Overconfident Managers
7.1 Introduction
In 2000, Steve Ballmer succeeded the comparatively modest Bill Gates as Microsoft’s
CEO. Ballmer is famous for his “frighteningly enthusiastic style” and “blatant arrogance”.
At that time, Microsoft was at the brink of losing its antitrust law suit following its web-
browser ”war” with Netscape and was even threatened to be split up into two separate
companies. At the same time the free operating system Linux became increasingly im-
portant and gained market share especially amongst professional users. Thus Microsoft
was challenged on its core market for operating systems, the basis of its dominant market
position. In the face of the antitrust lawsuits it was hard for Microsoft to use observable
contracts to commit to fight hard for its dominant position as the courts could take offence
of that. However, relying on Steve Ballmer’s personal characteristics remained a viable
option.
Recent papers by Malmendier and Tate (2003) and Malmendier and Tate (forthcoming)
as well as numerous studies in organizational behavior and psychology suggest that exec-
utives are especially prone to overconfidence1. Most of these studies find that managers
1Cf. e.g. Langer (1975), Weinstein (1980), or March and Shapira (1987) and the previous chapter for
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with this trait take value–destroying actions. But why do firms hire managers who are
apparently not the right type to deal with business as they misperceive the true envi-
ronment? This is even more surprising as Malmendier and Tate’s studies suggest that
overconfidence is an observable characteristic.
There have been several attempts to highlight the upsides of overconfident managers
but those focussed on intra–firm issues2. This paper suggests another interpretation: It
might pay for a firm to hire an overconfident manager for strategic reasons. By hiring such
an “irrational” type the firm can commit to act differently in product market competition
and it might try to use this to get a competitive edge over its competitors3.
We analyze two duopoly models capturing the polar cases of Bertrand and Cournot
competition where the firms have the opportunity to carry out cost reducing R&D before
they enter into product market competition. In the Bertrand model the R&D stage is
modelled as a tournament, following Lazear and Rosen (1981) or Lazear (1989), where the
winner of the tournament wins the market. An overconfident manager, however, thinks
the tournament is biased in his favor and relaxes his efforts. By delegating to overconfident
managers the firms can escape the rat race nature of these R&D tournaments. In the
Cournot model I follow Brander and Spencer (1983) who were the first to analyze the
strategic effects of R&D on later competition4. The overconfident manager here expects
the product market to be more profitable than is the true expected value. Overconfidence
helps to commit to more aggressive R&D.
As opposed to the literature on contractual strategic delegation we find that - under
some qualifications - both in price and in quantity competition an overconfident manager
can improve the situation for the firm and optimal delegation goes in the same direction.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes a model
an extensive survey of this literature.
2Cf. e.g. Van den Steen (2001) or the previous chapter for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
3Kyle and Wang (1997) employ a similar idea with overconfident traders in a financial market.
4Zhang and Zhang (1997) and Kopel and Riegler (2004) take up the classic literature on strategic
delegation, e.g. Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), and Fershtman and Judd (1987), and analyze a
Cournot model with the possibility to ex–ante perform R&D. Here the firms can strategically distort
their manager’s compensation contract away from profit maximization. However, Zhang and Zhang
(1997) and Kopel and Riegler (2004) come to conflicting conclusions.
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capturing Bertrand competition. Section 3 turns to the analysis of Cournot competition.
Section 4 discusses several possible extensions and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
contains some derivations.
7.2 Competition in Prices
7.2.1 The Model
We are looking at two firms competing in prices. Products are not differentiated, thus,
consumers base their decisions solely on the prices. The marginal production cost of firm
i, with i = 1, 2, equals Ci = ci − θi − i, where θi ∈ [0, ci] is agent i’s cost reduction effort
and i is a noise term, which is i.i.d. across players and distributed according to G(·) on
[−¯, ¯]5. This R&D technology resembles a tournament model as in Lazear and Rosen
(1981) or Lazear (1989) where the winner is determined depending on effort and luck.
The cost reducing R&D comes at a cost γ(θi) with γ
′(·) > 0 and γ ′′(·) > 0.
There is a unit mass of consumers with valuation v > max [c1, c2] . Overconfidence
is modelled as the manager believing that his product is vertically differentiated by ki
(with ki ∈ R+) against his opponent’s product. Thus he can charge a mark up of ki given
equal costs and consumers are still willing to buy his product. This is an extreme way
of modelling the manager’s belief that his firm’s product is a particularly good fit to the
consumers’ demands. In tournament terminology, both managers believe the tournament
is biased in their favor.
The timing of the model is as follows:
t = 0 The firms simultaneously hire possibly overconfident managers.
t = 1 The managers simultaneously determine their cost reduction investments θ.
t = 2 The actual production costs Ci are realized and observed.
t = 3 The firms compete in prices.
5To avoid Ci < 0 assume that ci is large enough relative to ¯.
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7.2.2 Analysis
We are looking for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and solve the game by backward
induction.
In the Bertrand Competition stage in t = 3 the profits are given by
pii =
{
Cj − Ci − γ(θ∗i ) if Ci < Cj
−γ(θ∗i ) otherwise
.
Note that these profits are independent of the absolute cost level but only depend on
the difference. Thus, firms would like to spend as little on R&D as possible. In the R&D
investment stage in t = 2 the possibly overconfident manager believes that consumers will
buy his firm’s product as long as pi ≤ pj + ki.
The manager is interested in winning the market as this allows the firm to stay in the
market. This gives him private benefits B which can be thought of as promotion prospects
or benefits of control 6.
Thus, the firm 1 manager maximizes
max
θ1
Pr(c1 > c2 + k1)B − γ(θ1)
⇐⇒
Pr(2 − 1 < c2 − θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)B − γ(θ1).
Let z ≡ 2 − 1 be the convoluted distribution. z is distributed according to H(z) with
z ∈ [−2¯, 2¯]. As standard in the tournament literature we assume
1) E(z) = 0
2) ∀zˆ : H(zˆ) = 1−H(−zˆ)
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that z is symmetrically distributed around 0. They are
satisfied e.g. if the  are normally or uniformly distributed.
6One could also think of it as a simple bonus contract which would be the optimal contract if staying
in or exiting the market is the only verifiable performance measure.
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Thus the first manager’s problem can be written as
max
θ1
H(c2 − θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)B − γ(θ1).
Manager 1’s optimal choice depends on which action he thinks manager 2 will choose.
I assume that manager 1 thinks he is advantaged and believes that agent 2 agrees with
1’s perception7. Thus, manager 1 thinks that the fictitious manager 2 maximizes
max
θ2
Pr(c2 − θ2 − 2 < c1 − θ1 − 1 − k1)B − γ(θ2)
⇐⇒
max
θ2
{1−H(c2 − θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)}B − γ(θ2)
The first order conditions of this game can be written as
h(c2 − θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)B − γ′(θ1) = 0
h(c2 − θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)B − γ′(θ2) = 0.
Dividing them yields
γ′(θ1)
γ′(θ2)
= 1.
Remember that manager 2 is here only sort of fictitious. The above calculations give
the standard tournament result that equilibrium effort levels coincide, θ∗1 = θ˜
∗
2, where θ˜
∗
2
is the effort level manager 1 believes manager 2 chooses. For manager 2 we perform the
same task and end up with the symmetric result θ∗2 = θ˜
∗
1.
Now consider the case that firms are initially identical, i.e. c1 = c2. Using θ
∗
i = θ˜
∗
j in
the two above first order conditions we see that equilibrium effort is given by
γ′(θ∗i ) = h(ki)B.
From the symmetry assumptions on H (·) and h (·) it follows that effort decreases the
further ki is away from 0.
7This clearly violates Aumann’s impossibility result on agreeing to disagree. However, this assumption
is quite common in the literature on overconfidence. Cf. for example Van den Steen (2001).
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We can use this when analyzing the firm’s decision at the hiring stage. Given the agents’
effort level firm i now maximizes over the type ki. To ease exposition restrict attention
to the case where the cost of R&D investment is given by γ(θi) =
1
2
θ2i . The problems for
firm 1 and 2 are given by respectively
max
k1
H[h(k1)B − h(k2)B][h(k1)B − h(k2)B]− 1
2
(h(k1)B)
2
and
max
k2
{1−H(h(k1)B − h(k2)B)}[h(k1)B − h(k2)B]− 1
2
(h(k2)B)
2.
The first order conditions for these problems are
0 = h[h(k1)B − h(k2)B][h(k1)B − h(k2)B]h′(k1)B
+ H[h(k1)B − h(k2)B]h′(k1)B − h(k1)Bh′(k1)B
and
0 = h[h(k1)B − h(k2)B][h(k2)B − h(k1)B]h′(k2)B
+ {1−H(h(k1)B − h(k2)B)}h′(k2)B − h(k2)Bh′(k2)B.
Cancel out h′(ki)B and, since players are symmetric, focus on symmetric equilibria.
This imposes k1 = k2 which yields
h(0) · 0 + H(0) = h(k1)B
h(0) · 0 + 1−H(0) = h(k2)B.
Note that due to our above assumptions on symmetry H(0) = 1
2
. Thus, we get
h(k1) = h(k2) =
1
2B
.
We can see that the θi a firm wants to implement is unaffected by B as θi = B · 12B = 12 .
Hence a symmetric equilibrium exists in which the optimal degree of delegation is given
by the above equations.
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Figure 7.1: Convoluted Distributions
To ensure existence we have to assume h(0) ≥ 1
2B
. h(0) can be thought of measuring
the importance of luck for the outcome of the tournament. The higher h(0) is, the more
deterministic is the tournament. Thus we require the tournament to depend not too much
on luck.
Note that these equations do not uniquely characterize the exact equilibrium values
since h(·) is symmetric around 0 and therefore there exist two values of ki satisfying the
conditions above. However, inspecting the second order conditions of the problem ensures
that delegation to an overconfident manager, i.e. ki > 0, will always occur
8.
Proposition 1 In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model with R&D and price
competition, firms always hire overconfident managers.
To illustrate an interesting point assume for the moment that the error terms i are
uniformly distributed on [−¯, ¯]. This gives a triangular density function h(·) as shown
in Figure 7.1. If the tournament becomes more deterministic the triangular densities are
8See the appendix for details.
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contracted and become steeper. Carefully inspecting Figure 7.1 shows that the optimal
degree of delegation is non-monotonic in the noisiness of the tournament. First, as the
R&D tournament gets less noisy the optimal degree of delegation increases, then, from
some level onwards it decreases again.
To gain intuition, note that it is a standard result in tournament theory that effort
increases if luck is less important for the outcome of the tournament. One then can
interpret our result as follows: Starting from a noisy situation and decreasing the noise
increases the managers’ effort levels. The firms are interested in keeping R&D spending
down and therefore hire more overconfident managers who are less prone to spend much
effort. But the less noise is in the tournament, the more tempting it is to invest just a
little bit more to win the market almost certainly. In this situation it is too risky to stick
with a manager who thinks he has a competitive edge and be probably expropriated by
the opponent firm.
Note that the basic effect that delegation is most pronounced for an intermediate level
of noisiness carries over to more general than linear convoluted distributions. Proposition
2 summarizes these findings.
Proposition 2 The optimal degree of managerial overconfidence is non–monotonic in the
riskiness of the R&D tournament. When the technology becomes less noisy the optimal
degree of overconfidence first increases and then decreases again. Thus we should find the
most overconfident types in industries with moderately risky R&D technologies.
This concludes our analysis of price competition. In the next section we turn to the
case of competition in quantities.
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7.3 Competition in Quantities
7.3.1 Model
Here we consider a model where firms compete in quantities. They face a linear inverse
demand p = a − b ∑ qi. Before they enter the product market competition stage, firms
can invest in cost reducing R&D. By doing so they can reduce their initially identical
marginal costs of production C by θi with θi ∈ [0, C]9. Thus, firm i’s final marginal costs
of production are ci (θi) = C − θi.
To ease exposition we assume that a − C > 0, i.e. the market is initially profitable.
However, R&D does not come for free and the firm has to bear a convex cost γi (θi) =
1
2
(θi)
2 for cost reducing investments.
In an initial stage the firm has to hire a manager to carry out R&D and production.
We abstract from agency conflicts within the firm. The manager can be overconfident,
which is modelled as follows. As pointed out in the empirical literature, overconfident
agents – maybe due to illusion of control – underestimate the probability of bad events.
Here we assume that in the initial stage, when the R&D investments have to be taken,
the market demand is not yet known. This is modelled as a lottery over different levels of
a in the inverse demand, keeping b fixed. An overconfident manager underestimates the
risk of low realizations of a and therefore expects a higher expected market size. Due to
risk neutrality, we can solely focus on the expectations10.
The managers that are hired correctly perceive their opponents’ beliefs about the market
but do not adjust theirs accordingly. Thus we have again a model of differing priors as in
Van den Steen (2001) where agents observe differing beliefs but stick with their own.
However, once the true a has been realized the agents maximize profits given the pre-
vious R&D investments. The timing of the model is as follows:
9The R&D can be thought of as being stochastic with an additive error term with mean zero. As due
to risk neutrality only the expected value matters, we suppress this here to ease exposition.
10One could think of alternative ways to model overconfidence. For example with respect to b or with
respect to the manager’s cost reduction ability. However approaches along these lines turned out to be
not tractable.
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t = 0 Firms simultaneously hire a (possibly overconfident) agent.
t = 1 The managers simultaneously decide about the R&D investment.
t = 2 The true market size is revealed.
t = 3 Firms compete in quantities.
7.3.2 Analysis
We are looking for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and solve the game by back-
wards induction. In the product market competition stage the managers simultaneously
maximize firm profits by setting quantities. The firms’ problems are given by
max
q1
Π1 = ((a− b (q1 + q2))− c1 (θ1)) q1 − 1
2
(θ1)
2
and
max
q2
Π2 = ([a− b (q1 + q2)]− c2 (θ1)) q2 − 1
2
(θ2)
2 .
From the resulting first order conditions we can derive the standard reaction functions
q∗1 =
a− C + θ1 − bq2
2b
q∗2 =
a− C + θ2 − bq1
2b
,
equilibrium quantities
q∗1 =
a− C + 2θ1 − θ2
3b
q∗2 =
a− C + 2θ2 − θ1
3b
,
and equilibrium profits
Π∗1 =
(a− C + 2θ1 − θ2)2
9b
− 1
2
(θ1)
2
Π∗2 =
(a− C − θ1 + 2θ2)2
9b
− 1
2
(θ2)
2 .
7.3. COMPETITION IN QUANTITIES 111
We use these profits in the R&D investment stage where managers maximize expected
profits given their belief of the market size Ai by simultaneously choosing θ1 and θ2. The
problems are given by
max
θ1
Π∗1 =
(A1 − C + 2θ1 − θ2)2
9b
− 1
2
(θ1)
2
max
θ2
Π
∗
2 =
(A2 − C − θ1 + 2θ2)2
9b
− 1
2
(θ2)
2 .
From the first order conditions we can solve for the reaction functions
θ1 =
4a˜− 4C − 4θ2
(9b− 8)
θ2 =
4a˜− 4C − 4θ1
(9b− 8) .
These are now important for the optimal action of the firm in the hiring stage where
firms can decide whether to hire an overconfident manager with a belief Ai > a. For such
agents the reaction functions become
θ1 =
4A1 − 4C − 4θ2
(9b− 8)
and
θ2 =
4A2 − 4C − 4θ1
(9b− 8) ,
respectively. From these we can solve for the equilibrium values of θ∗i as functions of the
respective beliefs about the market size:
θ∗1 =
48C − 36Cb− 32A1 − 16A2 + 36bA1
81b2 − 144b + 48
θ∗2 =
48C − 36Cb− 16A1 − 32A2 + 36bA2
81b2 − 144b + 48 .
Note that for A1 = A2 = a the equilibrium values boil down to
θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 =
(36b− 48) (a− C)(
(9b− 8)2 − 16) .
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The firms’ problem is to maximize expected profits by simultaneously choosing a man-
ager with type Ai. The firms’ problems take the form
max
A1
Π∗1 =
(a− C + 2θ1 (A1, A2)− θ2 (A1, A2))2
9b
− 1
2
(θ1 (A1, A2))
2
max
A2
Π∗2 =
(a− C + 2θ2 (A1, A2)− θ1 (A1, A2))2
9b
− 1
2
(θ2 (A1, A2))
2 .
As we have closed form solutions for θ1 (A1, A2) and θ2 (A1, A2), we can use them in
this problem. Plugging these solutions in and differentiating the problems gives us the
reaction functions:
A1 =
(24Cb−32a+144ab−8bA2−18Cb2−198ab2+81ab3)
160b−216b2+81b3−32
A2 =
(24Cb−32a+144ab−8bA1−18Cb2−198ab2+81ab3)
160b−216b2+81b3−32
.
However, this three stage game is not at all well behaved. Inspecting the second order
condition of the problem shows that for low values of b, namely b ≤ 1.567 . . . , the functions
are all over the place11. Only for values of b > 1.567 does our analysis go through smoothly.
For smaller values of b we get corner solutions either at Ai = a or Ai = A where A is
implicitly defined by θ∗i (Ai) = C.
Again, see the appendix for a brief discussion of this issue. In the remainder of the
analysis we focus on the well behaved part, b≥ 1.567, where we can gain economically
more interesting insights.
From the above reaction functions we can solve for the equilibrium values of A∗1 and A
∗
2
A∗1 = A
∗
2 =
(8a− 6Cb− 30ab + 27ab2)
27b2 − 36b + 8 .
This equilibrium is, given the parameters, symmetric and unique. Given that we are
looking at the situation where b ≥ 1.567 we easily see that the comparison of A∗i and a
clearly shows that the firms always choose to hire overconfident managers.
11Be aware that Zhang and Zhang (1997) in their analysis of strategic delegation via distorting man-
agerial compensation employ a model similar to mine. They do not carefully check the second order
conditions which casts some doubt on the validity of their results. See the Appendix for more details on
the second order condition.
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A∗i > a
(8a− 6Cb− 30ab + 27ab2)
27b2 − 36b + 8 > a
After rearranging one can see that this holds whenever, as we assume, (a − C) > 0.
Proposition 3 summarizes this result.
Proposition 3 For b > 1.567 the unique and symmetric equilibrium has both firms dele-
gating to overconfident managers.
Given our equilibrium results for A∗1 and A
∗
2 we can solve for the equilibrium R&D levels
θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 =
(12b− 8) (a− C)
27b2 − 36b + 8
and equilibrium profits
Π∗1 = Π
∗
2 =
(32 + 160b− 216b2 + 81b3) (C − a)2
1728b2 − 576b− 1944b3 + 729b4 + 64
chosen by the overconfident managers.
7.3.3 Profit Comparison
Though we have shown that for b ≥ 1.567 it is the unique equilibrium to delegate sym-
metrically to overconfident managers it is interesting to see whether the possibility to
delegate is actually beneficial for the firms or whether they are in a prisoner’s dilemma
type of situation. Remember that the profits with delegation (OC) are given by
Π∗OC =
(32 + 160b− 216b2 + 81b3) (C − a)2
1728b2 − 576b− 1944b3 + 729b4 + 64
and without delegation (nOC) by
Π∗nOC =
(9b− 8) (C − a)2
(9b− 4)2 .
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Figure 7.2: Difference in Profits
Comparing these two expressions we find that
Π∗OC > Π
∗
nOC
⇔
6624b2 − 4928b− 1296b3 + 1024 > 0
which holds whenever b < 4.2625 . . . . I.e. for moderate values of b firms improve by
delegating to managers which are possibly overconfident while later on they loose out.
See Figure 7.2 for a graph of the profit difference. Proposition 4 summarizes this result.
Proposition 4 For moderate values of b firms can gain from the possibility to delegate.
For high values of b they are, however, locked into a prisoner’s dilemma.
7.3.4 R&D Level Comparison
One can also take a more welfare oriented point of view and compare the R&D activities
under the different regimes. Recall from the above analysis the equilibrium R&D levels
for the duopoly case without delegation
θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 =
(48− 36b) (C − a)(
(9b− 8)2 − 16)
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and for the duopoly with delegation to an overconfident manager
θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 =
(8− 12b) (C − a)
27b2 − 36b + 8 .
We can compare these to the monopoly case12
θ∗1 =
a− C
2b− 1
and to the social planner’s R&D decision13
θ∗1 =
a− c
b− 1 .
If we compare the duopoly with delegation to the duopoly without delegation we find
that
(8− 12b) (C − a)
(27b2 − 36b + 8) >
(48− 36b) (C − a)(
(9b− 8)2 − 16)
holds for all b > 1.567, i.e. in the parameter region under consideration there is always
more R&D investment in the case of delegation.
If we compare the duopoly without delegation to the monopoly case we find that
(36b− 48) (a− C)(
(9b− 8)2 − 16) > (a− C)(2b− 1)
never holds for b > 1.567. I.e. in monopoly there is always more R&D investment. If
we however compare the duopoly with delegation to the monopoly case we find that
(12b− 8) (a− C)
(27b2 − 36b + 8) >
(a− C)
(2b− 1)
holds for some interval of b, i.e. if b ∈ [1.567, 8
3
]
. However, even under delegation we
never reach the social planner’s R&D investment as
(12b− 8) (a− C)
(27b2 − 36b + 8) >
(a− c)
(b− 1)
12See the Appendix for the derivation of this result. There it is also shown that a monopolist never
wants to delegate decisions to an overconfident manager.
13See the Appendix for the derivation of this result.
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never holds.
Though delegation can never lead to the first best investment in R&D it can for some
parameter region improve upon the monopoly investment level. Proposition 5 summarizes
the findings.
Proposition 5 Delegation to overconfident managers is desirable from a welfare point of
view as it increases the R&D spending as compared to non–delegation. For some inter-
mediate values of b the investment level can even be higher than in the monopoly case.
7.4 Extensions
Now, having analyzed the two polar cases of competition there are a number of extensions
which could help to gain some valuable insights into the problem.
7.4.1 Separate Tasks
One could set up a model with two different tasks, one with strategic dimension and
one purely operative in nature. Almost surely one would want different types to perform
the different tasks. Whilst for strategic considerations an overconfident type should be
found in positions with strategic significance, the holders of purely operative positions
should probably better not be biased, as there is no (strategic) upside counterbalancing
eventually distorted actions due to overconfidence. This could have possible implications
for promotion policies for such different jobs or tasks. Kra¨hmer (2003) and Goel and
Thakor (2002) give some guidance on how to think about this problem.
7.4.2 Optimal Contracts
In this paper the focus was solely on the interfirm interaction whilst possible agency issues
within the firm were neglected. It would be interesting to see how optimal contracts
for overconfident managers look and how they interact with the market environment.
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However, the interaction of optimal contracts with the market environment is a tricky
issue even with fully rational agents.
7.4.3 Entry
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) show in an experimental study that overconfidence can lead
to excessive entry in competitive markets. One could analyze this theoretically by incor-
porating the location decision and see how overconfidence distorts decisions in this.
7.5 Conclusion
The analysis has shown that two models of price and quantity competition, under some
qualifications, both predict delegation to overconfident types. This contrasts the findings
in the classic literature, e.g. Fershtman (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987), on
strategic delegation where delegation under Bertrand and Cournot competition runs in
different directions.
However, the two models in this chapter are quite distinct in their setup. Therefore, it
would be desirable to find a common framework in order to analyze both problems and
get clear predictions on common ground. It would be especially interesting to see whether
the result by Miller and Pazgal (2001) holds in the framework with overconfidence as well.
They show the equivalence of price and quantity competition under strategic delegation.
Their intuition is that delegation makes competition more aggressive under Cournot and
less aggressive under Bertrand competition. If now the contract set is rich enough the
solutions to the two problems will coincide.
Already the two models in this chapter deliver testable predictions. First we find that
overconfident managers are more likely to be found in industries with moderately risky
R&D technologies. Second we find, that overconfident managers are more likely to be
found in industries where strategic interaction plays a role. I.e. they should be less
widespread in strongly differentiated or monopolized industries14.
14Note, however, that if entry to the industry is possible overconfident managers might still find their
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7.6 Apppendix
7.6.1 Second Order Condition for the Bertrand Case
Since B does not affect the optimal choice of θi, we normalize it to one to ease notation.
A symmetric equilibrium exists in which the optimal degree of delegation is given by the
above derived equations
h(0) · 0 + H(0) = h(k1)B
h(0) · 0 + 1−H(0) = h(k2)B.
Note that H(0) = 1
2
. Thus we get
h(k1) = h(k2) =
1
2B
.
Note that these equations do not uniquely characterize the exact equilibrium values
since h(·) is symmetric around 0 and therefore there may exist two values of ki satisfying
the conditions above. A look at the second order conditions however confirms that only
delegation to an overconfident type will occur in equilibrium.
The second order condition for firm 1 is given by
∂2
∂k1∂k1
= h′[h(k1)− h(k2)][h(k1)− h(k2)]h′(k1) + h′(k1)h[h(k1)− h(k2)]
+ h[h(k1)− h(k2)]h′(k1)− h′(k1),
which can be rearranged to
h′(k1) {h′[h(k1)− h(k2)][h(k1)− h(k2)] + 2h[h(k1)− h(k2)]− 1} .
Now focus on the second order condition at the symmetric solution to the first order
condition. We obtain
h′(k∗1){2h(0)− 1}.
place.
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Since h(0) > 1
2
has to hold to ensure existence, h′(k∗1) < 0 must hold for the second
order condition to be satisfied. Note that h′(·) < 0 only if ki > 0, hence the result that
k∗1 > 0.
For completeness we check the second order condition of firm 2 as well
∂2
∂k2∂k2
= h′[h(k1)− h(k2)][h(k2)− h(k1)]h′(k2) + h′(k2)h[h(k1)− h(k2)]
+ h[h(k1)− h(k2)]h′(k2)− h′(k2),
Rearranging and focussing on the symmetric solution gives us the following condition
h′(k∗2){2h(0)− 1},
which by the argument above again implies delegation to an overconfident manager.
7.6.2 Second Order Condition for the Cournot Case
The second order condition is given by
∂2 (Πi)
∂A1∂A1
=
3456b2 − 2560b− 1296b3 + 512
2304b− 13 824b2 + 28 512b3 − 23 328b4 + 6561b5
Inspecting Figure 7.3 shows that the condition is far from well behaved. For b ≤ 1.567
we get corner solutions either at Ai = a or Ai = A where A is implicitly defined by
θ∗i (Ai) = C.
Comparing the profits for a and A shows that the nature of the corner solution depends
on the difference (a− C) . For small differences we are more likely to get Ai = a and for
larger differences we get Ai = A as the symmetric equilibrium.
Looking at Figure 7.4 in contrast ensures that for b > 1.567 the second order condition
is strictly negative and the problem is well behaved.
7.6.3 Derivation of θM for the monopoly case
The monopolist solves first for the solution to
max
qM
ΠM = ((a− b (qM))− (C − θM)) qM − 1
2
(θM)
2
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Figure 7.3: Second Order Condition – Overview
which gives his optimal quantity
qM =
a− C + θM
2b
.
From that we get the equilibrium profits as a function of R&D spending θM .
max
θM
ΠM =
(a− C + θM)2
4b
− 1
2
(θM)
2
Differentiating with respect to gives us the optimal R&D investment
θ∗M =
a− C
2b− 1
and we can derive the monopolists profit
ΠM =
(a− C)2
(2b− 1) .
We briefly address the question whether a monopolist would ever want to delegate to
an overconfident manager. To check this we plug in equilibrium the values for θM with
AM > a in the monopolists problem:
θ∗1 =
AM − C
2b− 1
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Figure 7.4: Second Order Condition – details
max
A
Π1 =
(
a− C + C−AM
1−2b
)2
4b
− 1
2
(
C − AM
1− 2b
)2
.
Solving for A∗M gives
A∗M = a
and we can conclude that a monopolist never delegates. Absent the strategic rationale
for doing so that comes at no surprise.
7.6.4 Derivation of θSP for the Social Planner
The social planners would offer q∗SP =
(a+θSP−c)
b
.
Thus his initial problem
max
θSP
ΠSP =
1
2
qSP (a− C + θSP )− 1
2
(θSP )
2
becomes
max
θSP
ΠSP =
1
2
(a + θ1 − c)
b
(a + θSP − c)− 1
2
(θSP )
2 .
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From the resulting first order condition we can easily solve for the efficient R&D spend-
ing
θ∗SP =
a− C
b− 1 .
Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
When I started to work on this thesis four years ago I was, after writing my Diplomarbeit
on reciprocity, very much interested in behavioral economics. My first paper, which
became chapter 2 of this thesis, was in fact in this field. Whilst working on this paper,
during my PhD course work, attending conferences and summer schools and particularly
in the beginning of my one year spell in London, my enthusiasm for behavioral issues
attenuated significantly and I turned again to standard theory.
At some point, however, I became again interested and now I firmly believe that it
is the combination of those two fields - mainstream and behavioral economics - which
promises to yield a large crop. Amending standard models carefully with well–founded
facts from behavioral, experimental and psychological studies will help us develop better
models of economic behavior and will improve our ability to give good policy advice.
Especially in the fields of Corporate Governance and Organizational Economics this
shall prove to be a fruitful avenue to pursue. I hope the papers in this thesis will prove
to be at least humble contributions to our voyage on this avenue.
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